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Intellectual capital creates company value but generally this value is not 
recognised in the financial statements of companies.  This report moves 
forward the debate on how intellectual capital should be recognised and/
or disclosed in the annual reports of companies by offering new evidence 
regarding the views of finance directors, human resources specialists and 
marketing specialists, all of whom have a particular interest in intellectual 
capital resources.
The issues investigated include: the relative importance of intellectual 
capital components to the generation of company value; the level of internal 
management use compared to external disclosure of intellectual capital; the 
incentives and disincentives for disclosure; and the effectiveness of the annual 
report and other forms of corporate communication for the disclosure of 
intellectual capital.
The generally high level of variation in responses shows that there is 
considerable diversity in the extent of company value attributable to 
intellectual capital and in disclosure incentives and disincentives and hence 
in disclosure content and the communication channels used. The authors 
conclude that it is this diversity which represents the most significant 
challenge to standard-setters as they consider how to address intellectual 
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Foreword
Intellectual capital creates company value but generally this value is not 
recognised in financial statements.  The debate on whether “intellectual 
capital” should be recognised or disclosed in the annual reports of 
companies continues but how can this debate be moved forward and 
what steps need to be taken by the accounting profession and standard 
setters?   
This report takes a new perspective on the debate by investigating 
the views of finance directors, HR and marketing specialists on the 
relative importance of intellectual capital components to the generation 
of company value; the level of internal management use versus external 
disclosure of intellectual capital; the incentives and disincentives for 
disclosure; and the effectiveness of the annual report and other forms 
of corporate communication for the disclosure of intellectual capital.
The results confirmed the view that 50% or more of company 
value is attributed to intellectual capital.  The top contributors to value 
were believed to be customer relationships, competitive edge, company 
reputation and employee skills and education.  In terms of incentives 
for disclosure for finance directors the capital market related incentives 
dominated with the most important incentive being “helping to correct 
an undervalued share price”.  As might be expected the most important 
disincentive was harming competitive disadvantage – but views on this 
were very much company and intellectual capital component specific. 
For HR and marketing specialists, there were different perspectives 
with the most important HR incentive being “helping to create 
trustworthiness with employees” and for marketing the trade off between 
providing information to existing or potential customers and protecting 
competitive advantage.
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The annual report was generally identified as an effective 
communication channel for basic intellectual capital information but 
its usefulness for complex or previously undisclosed intellectual capital 
items was questioned and for finance directors the most effective 
communication channels were one-to-one meetings with investors and 
analysts and investor presentations.
Generally there was a high level of variation in responses showing 
that intellectual capital reporting is very much company and industry 
specific.    This represents a challenge to regulators and standards setters 
as they consider how to address this topical issue.  Survey participants 
supported standardised industry benchmarks for key intellectual capital 
disclosures – although further research into the constraints across all 
industries would be necessary.  
The researchers’ principal recommendation is for the IASB to place 
the intangibles project on its active agenda.  This research project also 
has relevance to the current IASB project on Management Commentary. 
This project was funded by the Scottish Accountancy Trust for 
Education and Research (SATER).  The Research Committee of The 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland (ICAS) has also been 
happy to support this project.  The Committee recognises that the views 
expressed do not necessarily represent those of ICAS itself, but hopes 
that the report will move the intellectual capital debate forward and 





The authors would like to thank Professor Christine Helliar, Michelle 
Crickett and Angie Wilkie at The Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
Scotland for their help and support.  The constructive comments from 
the anonymous academic and practitioner reviewers of the research 
proposal and the draft report were invaluable, as were the comments 
made by those participating in the pilot stage of the questionnaire survey.
The contribution of this research to existing knowledge must be 
attributed to the Finance Directors, Human Resources Directors, and 
Marketing Directors who gave so freely of their time and experience 
when completing the questionnaire survey and during interview.
Finally, the Research Committee and the authors are grateful for the 
financial support of the Scottish Accountancy Trust for Education and 
Research; without this support the research would not have been possible.
Executive summAry
Background
Intellectual Capital (IC) refers to the intangible knowledge resources 
which create company value.  The three main categories of IC are human 
capital, structural capital and relational capital.  Human capital includes 
the knowledge, skills, experiences and abilities of people.  Structural 
capital comprises organisational routines, procedures, systems, cultures 
and databases, some of which may be legally protected in the form of 
intellectual property rights. Relational capital is the resources linked 
to the external relationships of the firm with various stakeholders, for 
example customers, suppliers or R&D partners.  Under International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), many of these IC elements 
are not recognised in the financial statements, although certain non-
specific disclosures are required in the Enhanced Business Review by the 
Companies Act 2006 and others are recommended by the Operating 
and Financial Review (OFR) Reporting Statement (UK Accounting 
Standards Board (ASB), 2006).  Despite the persuasive force of the OFR 
Reporting Statement, the description of resources and intangibles in the 
annual report is still considered to be inadequate (ASB, 2007).  This 
situation appears unsatisfactory, given that the market-to-book value 
of some companies is extremely high and even the median figure was a 
multiple of over three in 2007 for FTSE 100 companies.  
Aims of study and research approach
The aims of this study, from a preparer perspective, are: 
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(i) To investigate the perceived relative importance of various 
components of IC within each of the three main IC categories in 
the generation of company value;
(ii) To uncover the level of internal management use relative to external 
disclosure for specific human and relational capital components;
(iii) To investigate the extent to which a range of theoretical incentives 
and disincentives relating to disclosure apply in the IC information 
disclosure context; and
(iv) To establish the role and effectiveness of the annual report as a 
means of IC disclosure in relation to other forms of corporate 
communication.  
To address these issues, questionnaire surveys of three key preparer 
groups drawn from UK domestic listed companies were conducted. 
Ninety three finance directors completed the main questionnaire, with 
shorter variants being completed by 67 human resources specialists 
(focussing on human capital) and 68 marketing specialists (focussing on 
relational capital).  Across the three groups, the 228 responses represent 
a 10.1% response rate.  Seventeen follow-up interviews were conducted 
to explore the issues further.  
Key findings
Importance of IC in value creation
Questionnaire findings:
•	 The majority of finance directors believed that 50% or more of 
corporate value is attributable to IC.  
ixexecutive Summary
•	 All listed IC components were viewed by questionnaire respondents 
as contributing significantly to company value to some degree.  
•	 The top four IC components comprised three relational capital 
components (‘customer relationships’, ‘competitive edge in terms 
of quality of product/service’, and ‘company reputation’) and one 
human capital component (‘employee skills and education’).  
•	 The top four human capital components were ‘employee skills and 
education’, ‘employee commitment’, ‘positive employee attitudes’ 
and ‘positive employee behaviour’.  
•	 The top four relational capital components were ‘customer 
relationships’, ‘company reputation’, ‘competitive edge in terms of 
quality of product/service’ and ‘data/knowledge of customers’.  
•	 There was a high level of variation in responses relating to individual 
components.  
Interview findings emphasised how IC components relate and 
interact with each other, and how companies transformed far-from-
market components and categories into close-to-market components 
and categories in the value creation process.  
Internal management use compared with external disclosure
Questionnaire findings:
•	 The top five human capital components used internally by 
company management (by 82% or more), were ‘employee training 
and development’, ‘workplace safety’, ‘employee remuneration 
procedures’, ‘employee turnover’ and ‘recruitment and selection 
procedures’.  
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•	 With the exception of ‘workplace safety’, external disclosure of the 
vast majority of human capital components was low (under 50%). 
•	 The top four relational capital components used internally by 
company management were ‘data/knowledge of customers’, 
‘marketing strategies’, ‘customer relationships’ and ‘competitive edge 
in terms of cost of product/service’.  
•	 The components most frequently reported as disclosed externally 
were, however, ‘brand names’ and ‘product portfolio’.  
Interviews revealed that companies attempted to capture 
information on the less tangible human capital components through 
opinion surveys, appraisal reviews and manager observation.  The external 
disclosure of customer components carried the risk of customer poaching 
by competitors.  Companies struggled with methods of obtaining and 
coordinating information about their customers.  
Incentives and disincentives in relation to IC disclosure
Questionnaire findings:
•	 All of the listed incentives and disincentives were believed to 
significantly affect the voluntary disclosure of IC, although the 
average importance varied considerably.  
•	 Finance directors considered that capital market-related incentives 
dominated the disclosure of IC information in general, followed in 
the mid-ranks by marketing-related incentives and finally human 
capital-related incentives.  
•	 The importance of incentives varied according to the category of IC 
information being disclosed – ‘helping to correct an undervalued 
share price’ was most important in the disclosure of both structural 
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and relational capital, whereas ‘helping to create trustworthiness with 
employees’ was most important in the disclosure of human capital. 
•	 Capital market incentives dominated the disclosure of structural 
capital.  However, the disclosure of human capital and relational 
capital were also driven by other incentives related to the category 
of information being disclosed.
•	 In terms of disincentives, ‘avoiding giving away “company secrets” 
or otherwise harming competitive position’ was the most important 
disincentive for all three groups.  ‘Preventing the creation of 
unrealistic expectations’ and ‘avoiding setting a disclosure precedent’ 
were ranked second and third in importance, respectively.  
•	 Finance directors did not consider that the importance attached to 
these disincentives varied significantly across the three categories of 
IC information.  
Interview evidence indicated that the human resources specialists 
viewed ‘helping to attract new employees of high calibre’ and ‘helping 
to retain employees of high calibre’ as the most important incentives 
in relation to human capital, while finance directors rated ‘revealing 
to outsiders the skill level of our managers’ as the highest human 
capital component.  The marketing specialists viewed customer-
focused incentives as the leading marketing-related incentives, the 
most important incentive being ‘helping to create trustworthiness with 
customers’.  There was conflict between the disclosure of customer 
relationship information to create trust with potential customers and the 
violation of trust with existing customers.  Comparative statistics (Key 
Performance Indicators) were deemed to be of value for benchmarking 
purposes, only in the presence of industry performance indicators.  It was 
recognised that the standardisation of such indicators is difficult because 
different measures are important to different companies.  Competitive 
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disadvantage was not viewed as a disincentive to IC disclosure in all 
cases, suggesting that IC disclosure drivers are situation-specific.  The 
marketing specialists emphasised that disclosure is a trade-off between 
providing information to customers and preventing competitors from 
receiving the information.  Disclosure is not always within a company’s 
control if it wants to avoid potential legal/commercial penalties.
Communication channels for IC disclosure and the role of the annual 
report
Questionnaire findings:
•	 Finance directors evaluated ‘one-to-one meetings with investors’, 
‘one-to-one meetings with analysts’ and ‘investor presentations’ as 
the three most effective communication channels for disclosing all 
three categories of IC information.  
•	 Several other channels were also effective, including the ‘annual 
corporate report’ and ‘company web pages’; the ‘interim report’ 
and ‘conference calls’ were considered ineffective for all three IC 
categories.  
•	 Human resources specialists rated the corporate annual report as the 
most effective channel, significantly higher than the other channels, 
whereas marketing specialists rated company web pages as marginally 
more effective than the annual report.
•	 The annual report was considered effective in communicating basic 
IC information; however its usefulness for communicating complex 
IC information or new, previously undisclosed IC information was 
questioned.  
Interviews revealed that both the human resources function and 
the marketing function contributed significantly to the content of the 
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annual report.  For the human resources specialists, the importance 
of communication to employees took precedence over the external 
communication about human resources.  The marketing specialists cited 
trade shows, conferences and events for customers/prospects as effective 
channels for face-to-face communication externally.  
Conclusions and implications
These findings confirm the importance of IC to the creation of 
company value, both generally and at the more detailed level of main 
categories and individual components.  The diversity and the situation-
specific nature of IC emerges as a key theme running through the 
findings, as does variation in disclosure incentives and disincentives, 
and hence disclosure content and the communication channels used. 
This is illustrated by: 
•	 the high level of variation in responses relating to the importance of 
individual IC components for value creation; 
•	 variation in the incentives to disclose IC externally across the main 
IC categories; 
•	 different views as to whether competitive disadvantage is a disclosure 
disincentive;
•	 the differential impact across industry sectors of regulatory constraints 
and customer disclosure sensitivities;
•	 variation across functional specialisms in views regarding the relative 
importance of the incentives to disclose IC; and 
•	 some variation in channel use for the disclosure of each IC category.
Owing to the situation-specific nature of IC, it would seem that 
regulators cannot hope to address this issue in its entirety.  Some support 
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is found for the development of standardised industry benchmarks 
for key IC component groups; however a degree of IC is unique to 
individual companies and companies are best placed to describe this 
uniqueness in their own terms.  This study has, nevertheless, shown that 
certain relational capital and human capital components are considered 
by a representative cross-section of preparers to be significantly more 
important than others and these key components should be a focus for 
future research.  There is an opportunity to investigate whether a set 
of industry-specific standardised metrics can be developed and their 
disclosure regulated.  Regulators and other stakeholders need to be fully 
aware of the industry constraints which prevent disclosure, specifically 
in relation to customers and products.  Further research into constraints 
across all industries would appear to be a necessary precursor to industry 
disclosure standards.
Our principal recommendation is for the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) to find the resources to place the intangibles 
project on its active agenda as this will help to generate further research 
into IC, its measurement and its disclosure.  It could be argued that 
the future of the accounting profession and its role as the key reporting 
function depends on effectively addressing this issue.  
This study makes three contributions to the literature on IC.  First, 
it investigates the views of key personnel regarding the nature of IC, 
its measurement and its disclosure across the finance, human resources 
and marketing functions.  Second, it investigates whether disclosure 
incentives and disincentives vary across the three main IC categories. 
Third, it undertakes a large-scale questionnaire of UK preparers’ views 
regarding IC and its disclosure.  While the findings of this study add to 
the significant body of ICAS-funded research on intangibles and IC in 
the UK (Fincham and Roslender, 2003; Holland, 2004; Davison and 
Skerratt, 2006; Mangena et al., 2010; and Roslender et al., 2009), more 
research is needed.  
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Background to the research
Intellectual Capital (IC) is a term that is now widely used among 
accounting regulators, professional bodies and academics and increasingly 
recognised by business professionals.  It is a term, borrowed from the 
management discipline, used to refer to intangible resources which create 
company value (Ashton, 2005).  These knowledge resources, traditionally 
referred to as ‘intangible assets’ by accountants, have become increasingly 
important in the modern knowledge economy.  
There are generally recognised to be three main categories of IC: 
human capital, structural capital and relational capital (Meritum, 2002, 
p.63).  Human capital is the knowledge that employees take with them 
when they leave the firm and includes the knowledge, skills, experiences 
and abilities of people.  While some of this knowledge is unique to the 
individual, some may be generic.  Structural capital is the knowledge 
that stays within the firm at the end of the working day.  It comprises 
organisational routines, procedures, systems, cultures and databases, 
some of which may be legally protected in the form of intellectual 
property rights.  Finally, relational capital is the resources linked to the 
external relationships of the firm, with for example customers, suppliers 
or Research and Development (R&D) partners.  It comprises that part 
of human and structural capital involved with the company’s relations 
with stakeholders plus the perceptions that they hold about the company. 
At present, many of these IC elements are not recognised as assets 
in the financial statements, with investment in such resources being 
expensed in the income statement.  The International Accounting 
Standard (IAS) that relates directly to IC is IAS 38 Intangible Assets 
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(IASB, 2009a), with IAS 36 Impairment of Assets (IASB, 2009b) 
and International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 3 Business 
Combinations (IASB, 2009c) also being relevant.  In the UK, IFRS 
are now mandatory for all domestic listed companies’ consolidated 
accounts.  IAS 38 requires an entity to recognise an intangible asset 
(whether purchased or internally-generated) if ‘it is probable that the 
future economic benefits that are attributable to the asset will flow to 
the entity; and the cost of the asset can be measured reliably’.  Many 
items, such as internally-generated goodwill, brands, customer lists and 
most development costs, are specifically not permitted to be recognised. 
The International Accounting Standards Board’s (IASB) intangible assets 
project observes that current requirements place severe limitations on 
the types of intangible asset that may be recognised and that mandatory 
disclosure requirements (which may compensate for the limitations of 
recognition) are limited.  The IASB concluded that IAS 38 requires 
fundamental review given the increased significance of intangible 
assets.  A few commentators dissent from this view, however, arguing 
that the earnings from intangibles flow through the income statement 
and that this is sufficient for valuation purposes (Penman, 2009).  At 
the time of writing, the intangibles project is not on the active list, as 
the IASB considers that it is unable to resource a project of this scale 
(IASB, 2009d).  
Certain disclosures are required to be made in the corporate annual 
report outside the financial statements, and some of these relate to IC, 
although not in a specific way.  Companies are required to provide in 
the directors’ report an enhanced business review (EBR) that discloses 
information that is material to understanding the development, 
performance and position of the company, and the principal risks and 
uncertainties facing it (DTI, 2005).  Compliance with the Operating and 
Financial Review (OFR) Reporting Statement (ASB, 2006) will more 
than meet the legal requirements for the EBR.  The reporting statement 
states that key performance indicators (KPIs), which are defined as 
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quantified measurements that reflect the entity’s critical success factors, 
should be disclosed.  It is left to the directors to determine what the 
entity’s KPIs are.  The Companies Act 2006 (section 417) extends the 
EBR requirements for quoted companies to include the main trends 
and factors likely to affect the future development, performance and 
position of the company’s business; information about the environment, 
employees and social and community issues; and information on 
significant contractual or other arrangements which are critical to the 
business.  
Clearly, however, the implementation of these requirements calls for 
subjective judgement and disclosures relating to IC may be judged not 
to fall within the parameters of the regulations; alternatively, disclosures 
may be made at a very high level of generality.  Beyond the mandatory 
requirements relating to IC in the annual report, companies may of 
course choose to make additional voluntary disclosures and a variety 
of incentives to do so exist.  In a general review of narrative reporting 
by UK listed companies since the new regulations were introduced, the 
Accounting Standards Board (ASB) concluded that ‘companies need 
to think carefully about the description of the resources available to the 
entity, in particular those intangible items not reflected in the balance 
sheet’ (2007, p.3, emphasis in original).
If the market is aware of a company’s IC and believes that it will 
bring value, then IC will be reflected in the market share price.  Thus, 
IC will, at least in part1, be reflected in the difference between market 
and book values, since, as discussed above, intangibles are not adequately 
reflected in the traditional accounting framework.  Market-to-book 
ratios can be used to indicate the potential significance of IC.  The 
S&P 500’s average market-to-book ratio was 4.5 in September 2003 
(Gu and Lev, 2004), indicating for every $4.5 of market value, only $1 
appears on the balance sheet.  Beattie and Thomson (2005) found the 
mean market-to-book value for the UK FTSE 100 companies to be 2.52 
(based on data for year-end 2002/3 and excluding several companies 
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with negative reserves), indicating that 60% of company value was not 
shown on the balance sheet.  For 2007 year-ends, just before the current 
financial crisis, the figure had risen to 7.15 for the mean and 3.10 for 
the median (based on 91 domestic FTSE 100 companies with positive 
reserves).  Wide variation in these ratios is observed, both over time and 
across industries.  Market swings over time occur due to the economic 
cycle, with more severe crashes being related to financial crises.  At any 
point in time, knowledge-intensive industries such as biotechnology and 
pharmaceuticals tend to have the highest market-to-book ratios, while 
property companies have the lowest ratios (Beattie and Thomson, 2005). 
In modern times, however, even traditional manufacturing companies 
have significant IC embodied within them.
Given the importance of IC for most companies, efforts have been 
made to develop specific models for systematically reporting IC externally 
(e.g. Edvinsson and Malone, 1997; Sveiby, 1997; Lev, 2001; and for 
a useful review see Ricceri, 2008).  Most recently, a focused narrative-
based approach to IC reporting has been proposed by Danish industry 
regulators (DATI, 2000 and 2002; DMSTI, 2003).  To date, however, 
these models have been adopted by very few companies.
The disclosure of IC information in the corporate annual report has 
been investigated using content analysis (e.g. Guthrie and Petty, 2000; 
Brennan, 2001; Bozzolan et al., 2003; Guthrie et al., 2007; Li et al., 
2008).  These studies assess the extent to which different categories of 
IC information are disclosed and infer from this the relative importance 
of different components of the IC concept.  The documented level of IC 
disclosure has been evaluated as ‘low’ in such studies.  This is attributed 
to the lack of an established IC reporting framework and the general 
lack of a proactive stance by companies in attempting to measure and 
externally report IC information (Guthrie and Petty, 2000).  Some of 
these studies go on to examine cross-sectional relationships between 
IC disclosure and company characteristics, as a way of evaluating the 
incentives (and disincentives) to disclose IC information.  
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Of course, it may be that, although the annual report continues to 
be viewed as a central reporting document, IC is disclosed externally 
using other channels of communication.  A crucial characteristic of the 
annual report is that it is not a timely source of information and it is also 
becoming extremely long and arguably impenetrable (FRC, 2009).  In a 
single company case study, McInnes et al. (2007) investigate the range 
of communication channels used to communicate with a wide range of 
stakeholders, not just capital market participants.  These channels (e.g. 
hard copy reports, company website, face-to-face meetings, newsletters) 
are identified to have a range of attributes, such as timeliness to decision 
and interactivity, that influence stakeholder uptake and hence their 
use by preparers.  In interviews with UK finance directors, Unerman 
et al. (2007) found that the annual report was not used to make new 
IC disclosures and the most effective means of communication was 
considered to be face-to-face meetings with investors and analysts.  
Preparers views of IC, its management and its disclosure have also 
been explored directly using case studies and semi-structured interviews 
for a small number of companies (e.g. Chaminade and Roberts, 2003; 
Roslender and Fincham, 2004; Unerman et al., 2007).  However, there 
appears to be a dearth of large-sample questionnaire studies of preparers’ 
attitudes and beliefs regarding IC and IC disclosure.  The survey method 
has been recently adopted in the US context (Graham et al., 2005) to 
investigate voluntary disclosure in general, and to establish the relative 
importance of various theoretical voluntary disclosure issues.  To our 
knowledge, no large-scale questionnaire-based investigation of disclosure 
decisions that focuses on the particular issue of IC has been undertaken 
in the UK.  It is anticipated that preparers will find it easier to respond 
to questions about disclosure when given a specific disclosure issue to 
consider.  Furthermore, the impact of certain costs and benefits may 
vary across disclosure issues.
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Aims and research questions
The aim of the proposed study is to obtain the views and opinions 
of key preparer groups affiliated to UK listed companies in relation to 
the following research questions (RQs):
1) IC contribution to corporate value
 RQ1: What is the view of key preparers regarding the relative 
importance of the various components of IC that have been 
identified in the academic literature in the generation of company 
value?
2) Internal use and external disclosure
 RQ2: What are the levels of internal management use and external 
disclosure for specific human and relational capital components?
3) Incentives and disincentives in relation to IC disclosure
 RQ3a: What is the relative importance of the various incentives 
and disincentives in relation to the IC external disclosure decision? 
 RQ3b: How do the costs and benefits of IC disclosure relate to the 
three IC categories (Human, Structural and Relational Capital)?
4) Communication channels for IC disclosure and the role of the annual 
report
 RQ4a: How effective are the various forms of communication 
in relation to the disclosure of the three IC categories (Human, 
Structural and Relational Capital)?
 RQ4b: In what way is the annual report used as a vehicle for IC 
disclosure?
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To address these questions, questionnaire surveys of three key 
preparer groups were undertaken to investigate the IC disclosure 
decisions of a cross-section of UK domestic listed companies.  Finance 
directors are considered to be the relevant senior personnel who have 
specialist knowledge and understanding of the company’s capital market 
relationships as well as a general knowledge and understanding of all 
aspects of the business.  Capital market participants are interested in 
all three categories of IC.  Two shorter, specialist questionnaires were 
also sent out, asking more finely grained and tailored questions of the 
functional heads of human resources and marketing.  These are the two 
functional areas that relate directly to one specific category of IC – human 
capital and relational capital, respectively.  Research questions one, three 
(a) and four (a) were asked of all three groups; research questions three (b) 
and four (b) were asked of the finance director group only; and research 
question two was asked of the specialist groups only, in relation to their 
area of specialism.  Seventeen follow-up interviews were conducted to 
explore the issues further.  
Report structure
Chapter two reviews several strands of prior literature relevant to IC 
disclosure.  The specific areas covered are: the nature of the IC concept; 
theoretical and empirical studies which investigate the incentives and 
disincentives in relation to voluntary disclosure in general; studies which 
directly investigate the incentives for IC disclosure using interviews, 
case studies and questionnaires to preparers; studies which indirectly 
investigate the measurement and determinants of IC disclosure using 
content analysis and statistical regression analysis of users’ views and the 
consequences of IC disclosure; and the communication channels used 
for external reporting generally and for IC reporting.
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Chapter three outlines the research methods used in the study, 
including the sample selection, questionnaire design and administration, 
questionnaire respondents’ profile and the interviewees’ profile.  
Chapters four to six contain the main results.  Chapter four presents 
the questionnaire and interview findings from the finance directors, 
chapter five presents results for the human resources directors, while 
chapter six presents results for the marketing directors.  
Chapter seven summarises the findings across the three sample 
groups.  Conclusions are drawn, policy implications are suggested and 
directions for future research are identified.  Finally, the contribution 
of the study is set out.
Endnote
1  The difference between market and book values can result from other factors such 
as the undervaluation of tangible and financial assets recognised in the balance 
sheet, intangible liabilities that are not captured in the balance sheet and market 
prices that do not accurately capture intrinsic value (García-Ayuso, 2003).
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Introduction
To achieve its aims, this study draws upon several strands of extant 
literature in the areas of corporate disclosure and IC.  Studies which 
define the nature of the IC concept are discussed in the next section. 
In the following section, the key insights from theoretical and empirical 
studies which investigate the incentives and disincentives in relation to 
voluntary disclosure in general are summarised.  The next three sections 
focus on the IC literature.  The first of these covers studies which directly 
investigate the incentives for IC disclosure using interviews, case studies 
and questionnaires to preparers.  The second of these summarises studies 
which indirectly investigate the measurement and determinants of IC 
disclosure using content analysis and statistical regression analysis. 
Studies which investigate users’ views and the consequences of IC 
disclosure are briefly reviewed in the third of these sections.  The 
communication channels used for external reporting generally, and for 
IC reporting in particular, are considered in the subsequent section.  A 
summary and assessment of voluntary disclosure decisions with emphasis 
on the IC context is provided in the final section.
The nature of the IC concept
The terms ‘knowledge resources’, ‘intangible assets’ and ‘IC’ 
are often used synonymously (Lev, 2001; Meritum, 2002; Lev and 
Zambon, 2003; Marr, 2005; Ricceri, 2008).  It is thought that these 
different terms emerged in different disciplines, with intangible assets 
(or simply intangibles) being associated with the accounting discipline 
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and IC/knowledge resources being associated with the management/
human resources discipline (Chaminade and Roberts, 2003, pp.736-7). 
Increasingly, however, all of these terms are becoming known across each 
of the relevant disciplines.
Unfortunately, the boundary around the IC construct is not clear 
(Mouritsen, 2003).  However, although there is no agreed precise 
definition of IC (Marr et al., 2004, p.314), there is broad agreement 
(see, for example, Lev and Zambon, 2003, p.603) that there are three 
major categories of IC: human capital, structural capital and relational 
capital.  The latter two elements exist at the organisational rather than 
the individual level.  Structural capital is also sometimes known as 
‘internal capital’ or ‘organisational capital’.  Relational capital is also 
sometimes known as ‘customer capital’ or ‘external capital’, as it concerns 
relationships with ‘customers’ and other groups external to the firm.  
An important distinction exists between knowledge resources, which 
is a static, stock concept and knowledge activities, which are dynamic 
flows (Meritum, 2002).  Rylander et al. (2000, p.737) describe flows as 
‘the transformations between and within stocks of human, structural, 
physical and financial capital’.  Moreover, it is recognised that synergies 
exist in operating these categories of IC together, creating a fourth IC 
element, termed connectivity capital (Bjurström and Roberts, 2007). 
Habersam and Piber (2003) empirically establish connectivity capital 
as a linking pin.
Most commentators view the IC construct as a hierarchy of nested 
concepts, with each of the three high-level categories having multiple 
lower-level components.  A total of 128 lower level IC terms, identified 
from a detailed content analysis of the IC literature, are shown in 
appendix one (Beattie and Thomson, 2004).  
Beattie and Thomson (2007) comment that the IC literature, which 
covers the broad areas of measurement, management and disclosure, is 
characterised by an increasing amount of discussion of related concepts 
such as strategy, value drivers, critical success factors and value creation, 
suggesting situation-specific IC components.
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Corporate voluntary disclosure in general – incentives 
and disincentives
Theory
The incentives to voluntarily disclose information can be explained 
in terms of a variety of economic and managerial theories, each of 
which focuses on a different aspect of corporate behaviour.  These 
theories include agency theory, signalling theory, legitimacy theory and 
stakeholder theory.  
Traditionally, economic theory has provided the main rationales for 
voluntary disclosure.  The existence of information asymmetry between 
inside managers and outside shareholders creates market uncertainty 
and increases the information risk premium component of the cost of 
capital.  Voluntary disclosure provides managers with the opportunity 
to increase their transparency to capital markets, leading to a lower cost 
of capital, increased share price and increased liquidity (Verrecchia, 
2001; Richardson and Welker, 2001; Lundholm and Van Winkle, 2006; 
Mangena et al., 2010).  Moreover, managers are assumed to act in a 
self-interested way, creating agency costs, whereby managers (the agents) 
make decisions that transfer wealth away from outside shareholders 
(the principals).  Outside shareholders anticipate this and discount the 
value of shares accordingly.  Voluntary disclosure is one mechanism 
that managers can use to facilitate monitoring by shareholders, thereby 
reducing agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
There are also economic costs that act as disincentives for disclosure: 
loss of competitive advantage; litigation exposure; and direct costs of 
collecting, processing and disseminating (Elliott and Jacobson, 1994). 
The fear of competitive costs, incurred through the adverse actions of 
existing and potential competitors, is often considered to arise from 
giving away proprietary information which assists competitors.  However, 
competitors’ reactions to disclosure and non-disclosure are extremely 
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difficult to predict.  Disclosure may deter competition and non-disclosure 
may still give rise to proprietary costs depending on how competitors 
interpret the non-disclosure (Wagenhofer, 1990).  Litigation costs can 
arise from allegations of either incomplete or misleading disclosure. 
In the former case, increased informative disclosure reduces expected 
litigation costs; in the latter case, the issue concerns the accuracy and 
truthfulness of disclosures, rather than the amount.  
Legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory, two closely related 
managerial theories, have been used to explain voluntary disclosure, in 
particular corporate social responsibility disclosures (Deegan, 2000). 
Companies may disclose information to appear legitimate in the eyes of 
society and avoid the imposition of costs arising from non-legitimacy. 
The disclosure choices of comparable companies may shape legitimacy. 
Voluntary disclosure of information could be self perpetuating in terms 
of maintaining and enhancing corporate value given that ‘intangible asset 
creation occurs through enhanced reputation and disclosure influences 
the external perception of reputation’ (Toms, 2002, p.258).  The 
managerial branch of stakeholder theory argues that voluntary disclosure 
is a response to the demands of the stakeholders most critical to the 
company’s ongoing survival, in other words, those that have the greatest 
importance and saliency in relation to the company’s activities.  The 
ethical branch of stakeholder theory proposes that different stakeholders 
have a right to IC information and so disclosure is responsibility-driven. 
These theories are, to a great extent, mutually consistent.  Rationally, 
therefore, the observed level and nature of IC disclosure for any company 
results from preparers trading off the expected benefits arising from 
disclosure incentives with the expected costs arising from disclosure 
disincentives, i.e. a cost-benefit trade-off.  
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Evidence
Evidence about disclosure incentives can be obtained directly, by 
asking preparers about the reasons for their disclosure decisions, or 
indirectly, by inferring the reasons from either observed disclosures or 
the consequences of disclosures.  In an important direct study, Graham 
et al. (2005) survey over 400 executives in US firms to investigate the 
factors that determine disclosure decisions.  Executives are found to be 
concerned about revealing sensitive information to competitors and 
sustaining corporate/personal reputations.  Voluntary disclosure is used 
to build credibility with the capital market and to avoid potential law 
suits.  Managers were found to make voluntary disclosures to reduce 
information risk and boost stock price.  They suggest that there appears 
to be a balance between trying to maintain predictability in financial 
disclosures whilst avoiding the setting of disclosure precedents which are 
difficult to maintain.  Managers believe that the stock market sometimes 
misinterprets or overreacts to disclosure announcements and thus make 
every effort to meet disclosure expectations.
Armitage and Marston (2007), focusing on the cost of capital, 
interviewed the finance director of sixteen UK companies to obtain 
views on the costs and benefits of corporate disclosure.  Findings 
appear to suggest a lack of consensus across companies.  However, cost 
of capital considerations did not appear to be the main determinant 
of corporate disclosure.  The promotion of investor confidence and a 
reputation for openness are cited as the main benefits.  Information 
creation, management time and the disclosure of commercially sensitive 
information were viewed as drawbacks.  Face-to-face contact with fund 
managers and analysts was considered most important to reducing the 
cost of equity.
A significant body of empirical research also exists which indirectly 
infers the determinants of disclosure by focusing on individual costs and 
benefits in specific situations.  Useful reviews of this extensive literature 
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appear in Healy and Palepu (2001), Core (2001) and Lundholm and Van 
Winkle (2006).  It should be noted, however, that most research relates 
to the US capital market.  The available evidence generally supports the 
theoretical association between disclosure and a reduction in the costs of 
capital (Botosan, 2006), both the cost of equity capital (Botosan, 1997; 
Mangena et al., 2010) and the cost of debt capital (Sengupta, 1998). 
Further, Lang and Lundholm (1993, 1997) and Healy et al. (1999) find 
a positive relationship between disclosure and debt and equity issues, 
implying a benefit to disclosure in the form of lowering the cost of 
capital.  However, although Kristandl and Bontis (2007) find a negative 
relationship between the level of forward-orientated disclosure and the 
cost of equity capital, a positive relationship is reported when considering 
the level of historical disclosure for a sample of firms operating in Austria, 
Germany, Sweden and Denmark.  
Healy and Palepu (2001) suggest that management compensation 
schemes in the form of stock options provide an incentive to engage 
in voluntary disclosure to meet insider trading restrictions and reduce 
contracting costs associated with stock compensation for new employees. 
In contrast, Core (2001, p.445) suggests managers selectively time 
both stock trading and disclosures at the expense of other stockholders. 
The impact of intermediaries, in the form of analysts and institutional 
investors, has also been investigated.  Evidence would appear to suggest 
that increased disclosure goes hand in hand with increased analyst 
coverage and a more efficient market valuation (Lang and Lundholm, 
1993 and 1996; Healy et al., 1999; Francis et al., 1998 and (in the UK) 
Walker and Tsalta, 2001).  Disclosure appears to be positively associated 
with institutional ownership (Healy et al., 1999), however too much 
disclosure is not beneficial if institutional investors are transient (Bushee 
and Noe, 2000).
The competitive disadvantage (or advantage) to voluntary disclosure 
is difficult to investigate indirectly.  However, Piotroski (1999) finds that 
firms with less variability in profitability across industry segments are 
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more likely to increase segment disclosure.  This evidence is used to infer 
that competitive edge is a consideration in disclosure decisions.  Guo 
et al. (2004) examine proprietary costs for US initial public offerings 
(IPOs) in the biotech industry, an industry characterised by fierce 
competition.  The amount of product-related information disclosed is 
found to depend on: stage of product development; availability of patent 
protection; and venture capital backing.  Additionally, as predicted by 
signalling models, increased disclosure is associated with a reduction in 
information asymmetry.  
The evidence in relation to disclosure and potential litigation is 
somewhat mixed.  Skinner (1994, 1997) provides weak evidence that 
litigation costs are lower for firms that pre-disclose, whilst Francis et al. 
(1994) concluded that pre-disclosure is not a deterrent to litigation. 
Lev (1995) finds that litigation targets communicated more extensively 
than a matched sample of control companies; however, they also issued 
more optimistic announcements and fewer warnings of an earnings 
disappointment.  
According to Boesso and Kumar (2005), corporate voluntary 
disclosure continues to be investigated primarily from the perspective 
of investors and financial markets.  They investigate factors other than 
the needs of financial markets driving the corporate voluntary disclosure 
of a sample of 72 Italian and US firms.  Firm size and industry are 
found to influence disclosure in both countries.  Business complexity, 
instability and volatility are found to affect the volume but not the 
quality of disclosure across country contexts.  Individual company 
emphasis on stakeholder management (proxied by quality awards for 
external communication and the ratio between operating income and 
number of employees) is a strong indication to the volume of disclosure, 
supporting the stakeholder theory of corporate disclosure.  The need 
for management of intangibles (measured by the difference in market-
to-book values) was significant in relation to the quality of voluntary 
disclosures by Italian firms.
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Direct investigations of the determinants of IC 
disclosure
Interviews and case studies
The preparer perspective has been explored using case studies. 
Chaminade and Roberts (2003) compare the findings of two action-
based studies that look at the implementation of the IC concept at firm 
level in Norway and Spain.  They argue that the term IC is ‘vague and 
meaningless’ for companies that have never worked with IC, the concept 
of IC generating specific interpretations only when operationalised. 
They suggest that the provision of many examples and cases will allow 
companies to ‘almost literally see what IC means... from their own local 
reference point’ (p.739) and permit the creation of the ‘firm-specific 
syntax’ necessary in order to use the concept (p.747).
Habersam and Piper (2003) undertake two interview-based 
case studies of the understanding of IC in hospitals, identifying the 
organisation-specific nature of the three forms of capital in the Meritum 
(2002) taxonomy and connectivity capital as the ‘glue’ between these 
three IC dimensions.  It is noted that IC is a technical term not 
commonly used in organisations.  The study identifies four distinct 
‘spheres of IC transparency’: metric (what can be quantified); literal 
(what can be written down); intuitive (what can be explained) and black 
box (what cannot be explained, i.e. experiences and personal ability).
Van der Meer-Kooistra and Zijlstra (2001) conducted in-depth 
discussions with three IC-intensive Dutch companies and four financial 
analysts.  The Dutch companies did not intend to report IC for 
external purposes because the disadvantages of doing so outweighed 
any advantages.  Disclosing sensitive information to competitors was 
considered a serious burden, in addition to the information costs.  IC 
reporting was thought to provide companies with the opportunity to 
increase their transparency to capital markets, resulting in a fairer as 
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opposed to a higher market value.  It was also recognised as valuable 
marketing tool.  From a user perspective, the financial analysts view more 
IC disclosure as a sign of strength compared to competitors, and also a 
sign of commitment of a company’s management to realising their goals.
Abeysekera (2008) conducted 11 case study interviews to investigate 
the motivations behind human capital disclosure (one category of IC 
disclosure) in the annual reports of firms in Sri Lanka, a developing 
nation.  All firms were found to disclose information pertaining to 
employee relations and employee measurement; this disclosure was set 
against a backdrop of replacing semi-skilled and unskilled workforce with 
new technology.  It is suggested that the motivation behind disclosure 
in this context relate to gaining support from the capital market and to 
appear legitimate.  Equality and workplace safety disclosures were not 
prominent, however it is suggested that this is a reflection of the political 
agenda in Sri Lanka.  Abeysekera (2008) concludes that human capital 
disclosure is used to reduce tension between firms and their capital, social 
and political constituents in the interest of further capital accumulation. 
In the UK, Fincham and Roslender (2003) and Roslender 
and Fincham (2004) report on semi-structured interviews with six 
knowledge-based companies to investigate IC issues.  They find that 
the understanding, measurement and reporting of IC in the UK is 
significantly less well developed compared to Scandinavian countries. 
They attribute this to the social welfare culture of these countries in 
contrast to the dominant market culture of the UK.  
Unerman et al. (2007) conducted 15 in-depth interviews with the 
finance directors of UK companies.  They found that financial statement 
preparers did not consider the annual report to be used to make new 
IC disclosures, i.e. any new IC information released to capital markets 
is through various other forms of communication.  The most effective 
means of communication was considered to be face-to-face meetings 
with investors and analysts.  However, analysts were not always perceived 
as engaging with or understanding the importance of IC information, 
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especially in companies in less successful stock market sectors.  The 
benefits from informing capital markets and other stakeholders of IC 
information appear to be weighed against the cost of loss of competitive 
advantage.  Preparers were also concerned that investors and analysts 
would develop overly optimistic/pessimistic expectations.  
Questionnaire studies
Gunther and Beyer (2003) used a questionnaire survey to obtain the 
views of 54 German listed companies (response rate 16%) in industries 
where intangible resources were thought to be of significance.  Disclosure 
of information on intangibles was found to be very limited, and where 
information was disclosed it was primarily qualitative.  Respondents were 
asked to identify the major internal and external factors critical to their 
company’s success.  Customers and competition in terms of cost, quality, 
time and flexibility appeared to be perceived as the most influential 
external factors.  Human capital appeared to be the most relevant internal 
factor, with internal processes including support processes and innovation 
in relation to product, service or processes appearing to play a major role. 
Findings suggest that companies will not disclose information on factors 
they don’t perceive as critical to success.  Measurement difficulties and 
objectivity appear to hamper the disclosure of information pertaining to 
factors critical to company success to some extent.  However, the major 
hurdle to disclosure is the reluctance to damage competitive position. 
From the respondent’s perspective, the capital market seems unable to 
process relevant IC information adequately.
Verma and Dewe (2004) investigate the valuation and measurement 
of human capital by surveying a mix of human resources and accounting 
professionals in UK private sector companies and local authorities.  In 
total, 288 questionnaire responses were obtained (a response rate of 
5.8%).  Fifty-two per cent agreed that measuring human resources was 
very or extremely important to their organisation.  From a list of 33 
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measures, ten were identified as being important by more that 70% 
of respondents, seven measures were used by more than 50% and five 
measures appeared in both sets (absenteeism, client satisfaction surveys, 
competencies, cost of people and turnover rate).  The main barriers 
to the valuation of human resources were identified as being: lack of 
understanding by others in the organisation; uncertainty as to what 
should be reported; lack of precision of measures; lack of wide acceptance; 
and lack of reliability.
O’Regan et al. (2005) conducted a postal questionnaire to 
investigate IC practices in the Irish information and communications 
technology sector.  Based on responses from 88 private firms (effective 
response rate 23%), an average of 59% of firm value was thought to be 
attributed to IC, with over half of IC value being attributed to human 
capital.  However, findings suggest that attempts to measure and monitor 
the IC element of firm value were lacking.
The external disclosure of IC information is governed by the 
availability of IC information internally.  Huang et al. (2007) conducted 
a questionnaire survey of listed Malaysian companies to investigate 
the availability of internal information in relation to a list of IC items 
identified from the academic literature, classified as human, customer 
and structural capital.  Based on the responses from 88 companies 
(17% response rate) and factor analysis to group IC items, an evidence-
based taxonomy of IC is proposed.  Eight subsets to human, customer 
and structural capital are suggested based on the internal availability 
of IC information: employee capabilities; employee development 
and retention; employee behaviour; development of products/ideas; 
organisation infrastructure; market perspectives; data on customers; and 
customer service and relationships.
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Indirect investigations of the determinants of IC 
disclosure
Content analytic studies
Many researchers have used content analysis to examine corporate 
annual reports in a single country context with the aim of identifying 
IC disclosures (Guthrie and Petty, 2000; Brennan, 2001; Bontis, 2003; 
Bozzolan et al., 2003; April et al., 2003; Goh and Lim, 2004; Abeysekera 
and Guthrie, 2005; Abdolmohammadi, 2005; Li et al., 2008).  Typically, 
the corporate annual reports of a small to medium sized sample of 
companies are manually searched for a number of pre-specified IC 
components (sub-categories).  
Further studies have adopted both manual and electronic searches 
across country settings (for example: Bozzolan et al., 2006; Vergauwen 
and van Alem, 2005; Vandemaele et al., 2005; Guthrie et al., 2007). 
To date, the observed level of IC disclosure in such studies has been 
consistently described as ‘low’.  However, the findings of studies using 
electronic word searches to investigate IC disclosure is questionable 
given the inferiority of this method as demonstrated by Beattie and 
Thomson (2007).
To date, only a few UK studies of listed companies have been 
published.  Unerman et al. (2007) and Striukova et al. (2008) use 
content analysis to investigate IC disclosure in a wide range of corporate 
media for 15 UK companies operating in four different industry sectors. 
They find that the vast majority of IC information disclosed referred to 
relational capital (for example, customers and distribution channels). 
Li et al. (2008) content analyse the annual report of a sample of 100 
UK listed companies using a checklist of 61 IC components.  Based on 
word count, relational capital accounted for 38% of all IC disclosure, 
structural capital accounted for 34%, and human capital accounted for 
the remaining 28%.  
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The vast majority of prior research has undertaken cross sectional 
analysis of IC disclosures.  Williams (2001) conducted a longitudinal 
analysis of IC disclosures in the annual reports of 31 randomly selected 
UK FTSE 100 companies over the period 1996 to 2000.  A continuous 
upward trend in the average amount of IC disclosure was documented. 
These findings are substantiated by Vandemaele et al. (2005) who find, 
on average, an increase in IC disclosure by Dutch, Swedish and UK firms 
over the period 1998 to 2002.  However, Abdolmohammadi (2005) 
found an increase in disclosure for only two out of ten IC categories 
investigated in a sample of 58 US Fortune 500 firms over the period 
1993 to 1997.  These findings may be the product of a slightly earlier 
time period, or unique to the US context.  Alternatively, to claim the 
continuous increase in IC reporting over time may be an overstatement.
Other corporate documents are also beginning to be analysed, such 
as IPO prospectuses (e.g. Bukh et al., 2005; Cordazzo, 2007; and Singh 
and Van der Zahn, 2008) and presentations to analysts (e.g. García-
Meca et al., 2005).  
Statistical regression analysis
The use of content analysis to document the extent and nature of IC 
information disclosed is beginning to be extended.  Content analysis is 
used to obtain IC disclosure indexes which can be employed in statistical 
regression analysis to indirectly investigate IC disclosure determinants. 
Bukh et al. (2005) investigate what factors explain IC disclosure in the 
IPO prospectuses for 68 firms listed on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange 
over the period 1990 to 2001.  Managerial ownership prior to the IPO 
and industry classification was found to influence the amount of IC 
disclosure, whereas company size and age had no impact.  
In a similar study, Singh and Van der Zahn (2007) investigate 
an association between IC disclosures amongst 334 Singapore IPO 
prospectuses and the cost of capital.  In theory, firms might be expected 
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to disclosure IC information to prevent the underpricing of their equity, 
which is a major cost of capital.  However, a positive association was 
found between underpricing and the extent of IC disclosure, especially 
amongst a sub-sample of IC intensive IPOs.  Findings appear to suggest 
that firms may not use IC disclosures effectively to reduce capital costs 
when issuing equity.  Instead, it is suggested that IC disclosure may be 
strategically used to complement underpricing, to encourage investors to 
bid up the price they are willing to pay based on the extent of disclosure, 
resulting in the development of an unhealthy speculative IPO market. 
However, the IC disclosure index used in this study captures only 
presence or absence of IC items, rather than volume or indeed quality 
of disclosure which would be expected to be more influential on a firm’s 
cost of capital.
Oliveira et al. (2006) investigate determinants of IC reporting in 
certain sections of the annual reports for a sample of 56 Portuguese listed 
firms.  Firm size, ownership concentration, type of auditor, industry 
and listing status were all found to be influential.  White et al. (2007) 
investigate the drivers of voluntary IC disclosure in a sample of 96 
listed biotechnology companies in Australia.  The level of voluntary IC 
disclosures was found to be significantly related to board independence, 
leverage and firm size.  However, board independence and firm leverage 
were only found to drive IC disclosures in large firms.  They conclude that 
IC disclosure is being driven by agency theory variables and corporate 
governance issues.  Firer and Williams (2005) claim to provide the first 
large-scale cross-sectional analysis with their sample of 390 Singapore 
publicly traded firms.  IC disclosure was found to be less likely in firms 
with concentrated ownership and in firms with a high level of executive 
director ownership.  Findings also indicate that firms linked with 
government are more likely to disclose.
Unerman et al. (2007) find that larger UK companies (FTSE 100 
companies) disclose more IC information than smaller companies, 
and industry sector influences IC disclosure, with the retail industry 
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disclosing the most.  This is consistent with the findings of Bozzolan 
et al. (2003) regarding company size and industry membership in the 
Italian setting.  Li et al. (2008) find significant associations between IC 
disclosure and various corporate governance characteristics, specifically, 
board composition, ownership structure, audit committee size and 
frequency of audit committee meetings.
Users’ views and consequences of IC disclosure
There are a variety of ways in which users’ views on, and reactions to, 
IC disclosure can be investigated.  Using a direct questionnaire approach, 
Beattie and Pratt (2002) ask users about the usefulness, for investment 
decision-making purposes, of a comprehensive list of 130 information 
items.  These items are grouped into 11 categories, five of which relate 
directly to IC: process value drivers; employee value drivers; customer 
value drivers; growth and innovation value drivers; and IC.  At the 
information category level, innovation and customer categories ranked 
fifth and sixth, while process and employee categories were placed in the 
lower orders, as was the IC category (pp.80-81).  Selected value driver 
information items were, however, rated very highly by users, notably 
R&D investment and capital investment.  
Another approach taken has been the analysis of the content of 
analyst reports to see what information they use to justify their stock 
recommendation of buy, hold or sell (e.g. Arvidsson, 2003; García-Meca 
and Martinez, 2007).  García-Meca and Martinez (2007) use a 60 item 
IC disclosure index on 260 full-text sell-side analyst reports on Spanish 
listed companies.  They find that analysts usually report information 
regarding a company’s strategy, customers and processes, less frequently 
providing R&D and innovation information.  Relatively greater amounts 
of IC information are contained in the analyst reports for profitable 
companies and companies with high growth opportunities.  
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The relevance of information on intangibles for equity valuation 
has been examined using capital market based studies.  It is argued 
that, where market value is highly dependent upon intangibles, non-
financial performance measures are of key importance (AICPA, 1994; 
FASB, 2001; Espinosa et al., 2009).  The type of information examined 
includes expenditure (e.g. R&D expenditure as an input indicator of 
innovation, advertising expenditure which builds up brand equity or 
customer loyalty, investments in human resources); capitalised values 
(e.g. software development costs); and non-financial information not 
included in the financial statements (e.g. number of patents, patent 
citations, or royalty income from patent licensing; customer satisfaction 
indices).  Illustrative studies include Amir and Lev (1996), Lev and 
Sougiannis (1996, 1999), Aboody and Lev (1998), Amir, Lev and 
Sougiannis (2003), Ballester et al. (2003), Pfeil (2003), Gu and Lev 
(2004), Abdolmohammadi (2005), Kohlbeck and Warfield (2007), 
Lajili and Zéghal (2005), Lev and Radhakrishnan (2005) and Carr 
and O’Brien (2008).  For example, Abdolmohammadi (2005) finds IC 
disclosure to have a highly significant effect on the market capitalisation 
of a sample of US S&P 500 firms; Lajili and Zéghal (2005) find that 
companies that voluntarily disclose labour costs command higher equity 
market values; and Lev and Radhakrishnan (2005) find that a company-
specific measure of organisational capital contributes significantly to the 
explanation of cross-sectional variation in market values.
Lev and Zarowin (1999) argue that the ability of accounting 
numbers to explain the variation in share returns has been declining over 
time, due to the growing importance of intangibles1.  In a review of this 
type of study, Canibano et al. (2000) conclude that current investment 
in intangibles is generally associated with higher future earnings and 
stock returns.  They note, however, that the focus of research has been on 
‘R&D and advertising to the detriment of other intangible assets’ (p.113). 
25literature review
Liang and Lin (2008) investigate the importance of different 
categories of IC in 261 firms operating at different life-cycle stages in 
the information technology industry in Taiwan.  A model which assumes 
market value is a function of accounting information and information 
not reflected in the accounting system is adopted to investigate the 
explanatory power of IC information in the growth, maturing and 
stagnation life cycle stages.  Overall, the order of importance of different 
categories IC information (listed from most to least importance) was 
found to be customer, process, innovation and human.  Interestingly, 
however, the importance of each category of IC information differed 
according to the life-cycle stage a firm was experiencing: customer capital 
was most important in the maturing stage and least important in the 
growth stage; process capital was most important in the growth stage 
and least important in the maturing stage; and innovation and human 
capital were most important in the growth stage and least important in 
the stagnation stage.  
Communication channels
In a single company case study concerning disclosure in general, 
McInnes et al. (2007) investigate the range of information sources and 
communication channels (such as hard copy reports, company website, 
face-to-face meetings and newsletters) used to communicate with a wide 
range of stakeholders, not just capital market participants.  Interviews 
with company management revealed a disclosure decision-making 
process which resulted in a complex mosaic of information provision 
(both mandatory and voluntary).  Communication channels were 
identified to have a range of attributes, such as timeliness to decision 
and interactivity, that influenced stakeholder uptake and hence their 
use by preparers.  
Cormier et al. (2009) investigate the use made of corporate websites 
as a disclosure platform for corporate performance by the largest listed 
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Canadian companies.  Using a coding grid comprising 111 items, 
grouped into nine categories, they explore patterns of disclosure and 
find that human capital category disclosures are linked to the social 
responsibility category disclosures, while innovation category disclosures 
and development and growth category disclosures are linked to customer 
value category disclosures.  Gerpott et al. (2008) examine IC disclosure 
quality in annual report and corporate websites for an international 
sample of 29 listed telecoms network operators.  As might be expected, 
the IC disclosure in both communication channels is significantly 
positively correlated.  European companies had higher IC disclosure 
levels that US companies.  
Unerman et al. (2007) find that the annual report contains less than 
a third of total IC disclosure across all corporate media.  The pattern 
of IC disclosure was found to differ across corporate media, with the 
largest number of disclosures made on web pages.  They conclude that 
IC disclosure in the annual report is not representative of overall IC 
disclosure practices.  Eighty per cent of IC information was provided in 
narrative form.  In follow-up interviews with finance directors regarding 
IC disclosure, Unerman et al. (2007) found that the annual report was 
not used to make new IC disclosures and the most effective means of 
communication was considered to be face-to-face meetings with investors 
and analysts.  
Davison and Skerratt (2006) focus on the annual report and 
annual review documents as communication channels and explore the 
use of different formats (words, pictures and graphs) to communicate 
information about intangibles.  Of particular interest is the finding that 
94% of all pictures communicated intangible aspects of companies’ 
businesses.  There was a strong positive association between the level of 
uncapitalised intangible assets and the extent to which voluntary words 
and pictures referred to intangibles.  Li et al. (2008) investigate three 
formats for IC disclosure: text, pictures/graphs and numbers.  They find 
that IC disclosures are mainly in text form.
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Summary
This chapter has reviewed several strands of the academic literature 
relating to IC and its external voluntary disclosure by companies. 
The discussion of the IC concept showed that, although IC is widely 
recognised to comprise human, structural and relational capital, the 
individual components of these categories are numerous, diverse and 
likely to be situation-specific.  This depth and breadth of the IC concept 
renders the construction of an operational definition of IC, and hence 
the measurement of IC disclosure, problematic (Beattie and Thomson, 
2007).  
The theoretical voluntary disclosure literature draws upon several 
disciplines to suggest incentives and disincentives in relation to disclosure. 
These costs and benefits are associated with issues such as: cost of capital; 
analyst following; institutional investors; competitive (dis)advantage; 
litigation; perceived legitimacy and reputation effects; managing 
stakeholders; and information provision costs.  Broad empirical evidence 
supporting the relevance of these costs and benefits for disclosure 
decisions exists, however the relative importance of each seems to vary 
across settings and across individual companies.  The majority of prior 
empirical research on corporate disclosure adopts an indirect approach 
to make inferences about disclosure incentives, sometimes based on the 
consequences of disclosure.  Establishing relationships indirectly between 
disclosure and other firm characteristics involves both constructing a 
measure of disclosure (which is problematic) and using proxies to capture 
the unobservable disclosure incentives and disincentives, such as those 
related to information asymmetry and competition.  
In the IC-focused literature, direct investigations into the importance 
of IC, its management and its reporting are limited and dominated by 
small samples using interview/case study based techniques.  Research into 
the relative importance of different IC main categories and individual 
components provides contradictory evidence.  A lack of development 
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in the management and reporting of IC is also evidenced across studies. 
Although the findings from interviews/case studies provide direct insight, 
they are not generalisable to the wider population of companies given 
the absence of a large cross-sectional representative sample.  
The use of content analysis to measure IC disclosure as an end 
in itself and as an input to statistical regression studies to investigate 
IC disclosure determinants is increasing in the academic literature. 
Several studies demonstrate the importance of communication channels 
other than the annual report in the disclosure of IC information.  The 
subjectivity involved in constructing an operational IC definition hinders 
researchers’ attempts to quantify IC disclosures using content analysis, 
while the situation-specific nature of the mix of IC components relevant 
for each company mean that findings to date are potentially a product 
of the method employed (Beattie and Thomson, 2007).  Further, the 
incentives to disclose IC information may vary according to the nature/
type of IC involved in each company.  
Overall, studies based solely on interviews or case-based studies, 
while giving an indication of the uniqueness of the IC embedded in 
each company and the distinctive set of factors influencing IC disclosure 
decisions, fail to permit generalisable conclusions to be drawn.  By 
contrast, content analytic and regression studies offer findings in relation 
to the ‘average’ company, but mask the underlying variety.  Although 
not without its own limitations, the questionnaire survey method can 
contribute to our understanding of IC since it permits different facets 
of the disclosure decision to be comprehensively investigated for a 
large sample of companies.  Not only can a range of theoretical drivers, 
including economic, managerial and behavioural drivers, be investigated, 
but their relative importance in relation to the three main IC categories 
can be explored.  Although, the survey method has recently been used 
in the US to investigate disclosure decisions in general (Graham et al., 
2005), very few studies have used the survey approach in the area of 
IC.  In none of the four studies identified in the section above on direct 
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investigations of the determinants of IC disclosure is the disclosure 
decision the focus of enquiry.  Moreover, the use of the survey method 
in the UK in both the IC context and in relation to a broad range of 
disclosure incentives and disincentives appears to be unexplored territory.
 
Endnote
1  A significant debate exists regarding how to assess the trend in value relevance, 




A postal questionnaire survey was used to investigate the views of senior 
management in UK listed companies regarding IC and IC disclosure 
decisions.  A survey permits different issues to be comprehensively 
investigated for a large sample of companies.  Seventeen follow-up 
interviews were conducted to explore the issues further and, in particular, 
to explore the reasons for the views stated in the questionnaire.  The 
sections in this chapter cover the following aspects of the research 
methods: sample selection; questionnaire design and administration; 
questionnaire response profile and sample characteristics; and 
interviewees’ profile.
Sample selection
The main questionnaire was sent to the finance directors of the 
population (591 companies) of UK domestic companies listed on 
the London Stock Exchange main market (industrial, commercial 
and financial companies excluding both investment trusts and real 
estate companies located in the Channel Islands) and a sample of UK 
domestic companies listed on the AIM market (the largest 409 qualifying 
companies by market capitalisation).  Finance directors are considered to 
be senior personnel who have specialist knowledge and understanding of 
the company’s capital market relationships as well as a general knowledge 
and understanding of all aspects of the business.  
Two shorter, specialist questionnaires were also sent out, asking 
finely grained questions of the functional heads of human resources 
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and marketing.  One variant of the questionnaire was sent to human 
resources directors (or the most senior human resources manager) of 
the population of UK main market companies on the basis that human 
capital is one of the major categories of IC (Lev and Zambon, 2003) 
and a key source of sustained competitive advantage (Verma and Dewe, 
2004).  A second variant of the questionnaire was sent to the marketing 
directors (or the most senior marketing manager) of the population of 
UK domestic companies listed on the London Stock Exchange main 
market.  It has been proposed that IC reporting can be used as a valuable 
marketing tool (van der Meer-Kooistra and Zijlstra, 2001).  Additionally, 
a recent survey by the Intellectual Assets Centre found that Scottish–
based companies are increasingly exploiting their intellectual assets with 
marketing materials (Outram, 2007).  
Questionnaire design and administration
A full listing of the six research questions addressed can be found at 
the end of chapter one.  The content of the questionnaires was derived 
from an extensive review of the existing IC literature.  The initial drafts 
were piloted using contacts provided by ICAS.  The two shorter, specialist 
questionnaires sent to the functional heads of human resources and 
marketing relate directly to a specific category of IC – human capital and 
relational capital respectively.  The three groups did not receive the same 
questionnaire due to their different knowledge bases and experience.  It 
was judged that only the finance director group would have a sufficiently 
informed understanding of the capital market aspects of IC, whether 
the incentives and disincentives impacted differently on the three IC 
categories and the role of the annual report to answer detailed questions 
on these aspects.  On the other hand, this group would have a less detailed 
understanding of the human resources and marketing functions than 
the respective functional specialist.  Consequently, the human resources 
and marketing questionnaires did not ask many questions about general 
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capital market aspects but did ask more detailed questions about the 
particular functional area.  In addition, a question concerning the internal 
use of the components of a specific functional IC category was asked 
only of these groups.  
The questionnaires generally used close-form questions and adopted 
five-point Likert scales with verbal anchors.  The questionnaire responses 
were not anonymous.  Potential respondents were allocated a reference 
number in order to improve the efficiency of the reminder process 
and to facilitate further analysis by permitting additional data to be 
independently collected for responding firms.  To elicit a frank response, 
the confidentiality of answers was stressed, and respondents were assured 
that any information provided would not be publicly associated with 
them or their company identity at any stage.  The mailing list of finance 
director names and addresses was constructed using both the Fame 
database and Hemscott.  A pilot test of phone calls to verify the mailing 
list was performed.  However, this test was not very successful in that 
companies appeared generally unwilling to verify names and addresses 
over the telephone and often the switchboard is not well informed in 
relation to the appropriate personnel.  The online resource Hoovers was 
used to verify the name and company address of every finance director 
in the sample.  Marketing and human resources contact names were also 
collected to the extent the information was available.  Any discrepancies 
in the data obtained from the different sources, for example in relation 
to change of directors, were resolved by executing internet searches and 
reference to the company’s own website.
The questionnaire was mailed in May 2008.  Several techniques 
were adopted to enhance response rate: clear questionnaire layout; 
piloting; personally addressed cover letters; individually signed cover 
letters; reminder letters sent 14 days after the initial mailing and 
another copy of the questionnaire sent 28 days after the initial mailing 
to all non-respondents; stamped reply envelopes (rather than pre-paid 
envelopes); and requests to non-respondents to return the questionnaire. 
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The response to initial mailings was very poor and slow.  In an attempt 
to increase the final number of completed questionnaires received, 
an incentive was included in the last round of mailing.  Respondents 
were offered the opportunity to enter a prize draw or have a donation 
made to charity.  These incentives to participate were funded by the 
researchers themselves; an Ipod nano was awarded to a human resources 
director and £275 was donated across four charities (Cancer Research, 
NSPCC, Oxfam and RSPCA).  Respondents were asked to indicate 
their willingness to participate in follow-up interviews.
Questionnaire response profile and sample 
characteristics
In total, 2,182 questionnaires were issued across the three sample 
groups.  After the two follow-up requests, a total of 228 responses were 
received (10.5%).  The sample groups and response rates are shown in 
Table 3.1.








Finance directors 1,000 93   9.3%
Human resources    591 67 11.3%
Marketing    591 68 11.5%
Total 2,182 228 10.5%
Of the 93 completed finance director questionnaires, 55 were 
received from companies listed on the main market and 38 from AIM 
companies.  In terms of reasons for non-completion, it is apparent that 
many companies have adopted a policy not to participate in surveys. 
Further, many personnel are operating within severe time constraints 
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and work pressures in the present economic downturn, which prohibited 
their participation.  Irrespective of this, the response rate is consistent 
with the 10-12% response rate considered to be typical for these ‘difficult’ 
target groups (listed company directors) in the current climate (Simsek 
et al., 2009).  Other recent UK mail surveys to senior finance executives 
and human resources professionals have obtained response rates of 8.1% 
(Marshall and Weetman, 2008) and 5.8% (Verma and Dewe, 2004).
In an attempt to establish the authority of the response provided, 
the company job title of persons completing the questionnaire was 
requested.  Of respondents who provided personal details, 68% in the 
finance director group indicated they held the position of group finance 
director, finance director or chief financial officer (CFO), for whom 
the questionnaire was intended (Table 3.2).  In the human resources 
group, 87% indicated they held the positions of director or manager 
of human resources.  The remainder appeared to hold other senior 
relevant corporate positions.  In the marketing group 64% indicated 
they held positions of director, head or manager of marketing/business 
development.
Table 3.2 Sample groups and corporate positions





Group finance director/finance director 44%
CFO 24%
Group financial controller/financial controller 11%
Group financial accountant/head of financial reporting 7%
Other directors 6%
Other 8%
* 21 respondents failed to provide their company position on the questionnaire
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Table 3.2 Sample groups and corporate positions (Cont.)
Panel B: Human resources group
Job title
Percentage of respondents 
(n=61*)
Group director HR 25%
Head of HR 16%





* 6 respondents failed to provide their company position on the questionnaire
Panel C: Marketing group
Job title
Percentage of respondents 
(n=61*)
Group/company marketing managers 21%
Director of sales/marketing/business development 20%
Other directors 10%
Head of marketing/business development 10%
Commercial director 8%
Group director of sales/marketing/business development 5%
Other 26%
* 7 respondents failed to provide their company position on the questionnaire
To investigate whether the sample of responding companies is 
representative of the groups mailed, a comparison was made on the basis 
of: industry profile; company size measured by sales and the number of 
employees; and market-to-book ratio.  Results for industry profile are 
shown in Table 3.3.  
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Table 3.3 Industry classification for population and responding 
groups





















% % % % %
Automobiles & parts 0.4% 0% 0.5% 0% 0%
Banks 0.9% 1.1% 1.4% 3.0% 1.5%
Basic resources 5.4% 2.2% 2.7% 3.0% 0.0%
Chemicals 1.5% 3.2% 1.5% 3.0% 3.0%
Construction & 
material 3.0% 2.2% 3.4% 5.9% 4.5%
Financial services 7.8% 9.7% 6.1% 4.5% 8.9%
Food & beverage 2.6% 0.0% 3.2% 3.0% 0.0%
Healthcare 6.8% 7.5% 5.9% 4.5% 7.5%
Industrial goods & 
services 23.3% 28.0% 25.4% 35.8% 29.8%
Insurance 2.8% 2.2% 3.6% 5.8% 1.5%
Media 6.4% 7.5% 5.8% 1.5% 0.0%
Oil & gas 5.8% 5.4% 3.7% 6.0% 5.9%
Personal & 
household goods 3.6% 1.1% 4.7% 4.5% 0.0%
Real estate 4.9% 6.5% 5.9% 4.5% 11.9%
Retail 6.1% 6.5% 8.3% 4.5% 1.5%
Technology 10.0% 9.3% 9.0% 1.5% 10.5%
Telecommunications 1.3% 0.0% 1.3% 1.5% 1.5%
Travel & leisure 5.4% 4.3% 5.6% 6.0% 10.5%
Utilities 2.0% 2.2% 2.0% 1.5% 1.5%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100% 100% 100%
Notes
1. x2 = 11.35, p = 0.879 
2. x2 = 15.55, p = 0.624
3. x2 = 24.91, p = 0.128; n=67 because 1 marketing questionnaire was returned anonymously
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The industrial goods and services industry is most represented in 
both the sample who were sent the finance director questionnaire and 
the finance director group of respondents (23.3% and 28% respectively). 
Certain small industries, namely automobiles and parts, food and 
beverage, and telecommunications, are not represented in the finance 
director group of respondents.  Overall, however, the industry profile of 
finance director respondents is not statistically different from that of the 
sample mailed.  The human resources and marketing questionnaires were 
sent to the smaller population of 591 main market companies.  Again the 
industrial goods and services industry is most represented: 25.4% in the 
population, 29.8% in the marketing group of respondents, and 35.8% 
in the human resources group of respondents.  With the exception of 
automobiles and parts, all of the industry classifications are represented 
in the human resources group.  The marketing group does not include 
any companies representing automobiles and parts, basic resources, food 
and beverage, media, and personal and household goods.  Irrespective, 
the industry profiles of the human resources and the marketing groups 
of respondents are not statistically significantly different from that of 
the population mailed.
Population and samples descriptive statistics for company size (sales 
and the number of employees) and the market-to-book ratio are shown 
in Table 3.4.  Companies with missing values have been excluded.
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Table 3.4 Size profile for population and responding groups















Number 992 93 588 66 67
Mean 
(average)
1,364 561 2,264 2,931 1,552
Median 97 90 295 454 249
Standard 
deviation
6,694 1,718 8,581 7,534 6,788
Minimum 0 0 0 0.001 0.5
Maximum 141,637 14,309 141,637 54,600 54,600
Notes
1.  t = 1.1526, p = 0.2493 
2.  t = 0.6056, p = 0.5450 
3.  t = 0.6561, p = 0.5120 















Number 983 91 583 65 67
Mean 
(average) 7,635 3,108 12,579 4,337 7,561
Median 598 482 2,049 1,380
Standard 
deviation 30,868 10,023 39,332 7,300 27,891
Minimum 2 3 3 5 12
Maximum 507,480 88,000 507,480 226,400 226,400
Notes
1.  t = 1.3917, p = 0.1643 
2.  t = 0.6649, p = 0.5063
3.  t = 1.0153, p = 0.3104 
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Table 3.4 Size profile for population and responding groups (Cont.)















Number 943 87 556 62 63
Mean 4.25 3.28 4.64 3.89 3.12
Median 2.34 2.44 2.41 2.60 2.62
Standard 
deviation 13.30 3.56 16.28 5.35 2.45
Minimum 0.25 0.29 0.25 0.25 0.40
Maximum 239.06 22.16 239.06 40.35 12.89
Notes
1.  x2 = 0.615, p = 0.433 
2.  x2 = 0.287, p = 0.592
3.  x2 = 0.866, p = 0.352 
On average, the finance group of respondents includes smaller 
companies in terms of both sales and the number of employees 
compared to the sample mailed.  The average sales for the sample 
mailed are £1,364m, compared to £561m for the sample of finance 
director respondents.  The average number of employees for the sample 
mailed is 7,635 compared to 3,108 for the sample of finance director 
respondents.  Despite the sample of finance director respondents 
containing smaller companies, the sales and employee profiles of the 
finance director sample are not statistically significantly different from 
that of the sample mailed.  The human resources group appears to 
include smaller companies in terms of an average number of employees 
of 4,337 compared to 12,579 for the population.  However in terms of 
sales, the human resources group average of £2,931m is in excess of the 
average of £2,264 for the population.  The marketing group also appears 
to comprise smaller companies compared to the population in terms 
of both sales and number of employees (average sales for the marketing 
group is £1,552m compared to £2,264m for the population; average 
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number of employees for the marketing group is 7,561 compared to 
12,579 for the population.  Irrespective of which size measure is used, 
the sales and employee profiles of both the human resources and the 
marketing groups are not statistically significantly different from those 
of the population mailed.
Turning to Panel C of Table 3.4, companies with negative net assets 
have been excluded and one further company has been excluded from 
the population statistics because its net assets are very close to zero, 
inflating the market-to-book ratio unduly and distorting the mean. 
Because several companies have very high market-to-book ratios, the 
median is a better measure of central tendency than the mean, and so 
comments focus on this statistic.  The median market-to-book ratio of 
each of the three samples is very close to that of the relevant finance 
director sample mailed and the populations of marketing and human 
resources directors.  Based on a statistical test that compares the medians, 
no statistically significant differences are found.
Overall, therefore, it can be concluded that the samples are 
representative of the relevant sample and populations from which they 
are drawn.
 
Interview methods and interviewees’ profile
At the end of each questionnaire, we asked if the respondent 
would be ‘willing to be interviewed to enable the issues raised in the 
questionnaire to be explored in more detail’.  Interviewees were selected 
from those who responded in the affirmative, with a bias towards finance 
directors, while attempting to ensure variation in company size and 
industry.  An generic interview instrument was prepared which was 
then tailored for each interview in advance based on the questionnaire 
responses given to explore the reasons for both ‘average’ and ‘unusual’ 
responses.  The interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed.  
A total of 17 interviews were conducted  (during the period 
November 2008 to February 2009) across the different groups of 
respondents: 11 finance directors, two human resources and four 
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marketing.  Fourteen interviews were conducted face-to-face, with the 
remaining three conducted over the telephone.  The profiles of the 17 
interviewees are shown in Table 3.5. 






Finance Group finance 
director
FTSE 100 Industrial Goods 
& Services
Face-to-face FD1
Finance Group financial 
reporting
FTSE 100 Healthcare Face-to-face FD2
Finance Finance director FTSE 250 Utilities Face-to-face FD3
Finance Group financial 
controller
FTSE 250 Industrial Goods 
& Services
Face-to-face FD4
Finance Finance director FTSE 250 Industrial Goods 
& Services
Face-to-face FD5
Finance Chief financial 
officer
AIM Financial Services Telephone FD6
Finance Group finance 
director
AIM Industrial Goods 
& Services
Telephone FD7
Finance Financial controller AIM Financial Services Face-to-face FD8
Finance Finance director & 
company secretary
AIM Chemicals Face-to-face FD9
Finance Finance director & 
company secretary
AIM Financial Services Face-to-face FD10






FTSE 100 Banks Face-to-face HR1
Human 
Resources





Marketing Head of marketing 
& UK retail 
marketing
FTSE 250 Financial Services Face-to-face M1





Marketing VP marketing FTSE 
Small Cap
Technology Telephone M3






 In the finance director group, five interviews are with respondents 
from main market companies included in either the FTSE 100 or FTSE 
250, and six interviews are with companies listed on the AIM market. 
The interviews conducted in the human resources and marketing groups 
are with main market companies.  All interviewees appeared to hold 
senior relevant corporate positions.
Summary
This chapter sets out the populations of interest in this study (listed 
company finance directors, human resources directors and marketing 
directors).  For each of these, the entire population of main market 
affiliated respondents was surveyed, augmented by a sample of AIM 
affiliated finance directors.  Three variants of the questionnaire were 
used, to reflect the different knowledge base of each respondent group. 
The procedures adopted to compile the mailing lists and administer 
the postal questionnaire are described.  Overall, 228 responses were 
received across the three groups, representing a 10.5% response rate. 
The representativeness of the respondent groups in terms of industry, 
size and market-to-book ratio is assessed.  Finally, the profile of the 
seventeen interviewees is described.
4results: QuestionnAire responses And interviews with finAnce directors
Introduction
The findings from questionnaire responses and follow up interviews 
with the finance director group are presented in the following sections, 
which correspond to the research question that they address.  The next 
section in this chapter considers the contribution of IC to corporate 
value.  The relative importance of various incentives and disincentives to 
the IC disclosure decision is considered in the third section.  The fourth 
section considers the disclosure decision in relation to the nature of IC 
information being disclosed.  Communication channels and the nature 
of information being disclosed are considered in the fifth section.  The 
sixth section focuses on IC disclosure in the corporate annual reports. 
A summary of finance director views is provided in the last section of 
this chapter.
IC contribution to corporate value
The overall contribution of IC to shareholder value for responding 
companies is evident from the questionnaire responses, with over 57% of 
respondents perceiving that 50% or more is attributable to IC, as shown 
in Table 4.1.  The contemporaneous FD sample market-to-book median 
of 2.34 reported in Table 3.4, Panel C is consistent with this expressed 
belief.  A market-to-book value of 2.0 equates to 50% of corporate value 
being unrecognised IC.
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Table 4.1 Perceptions of the amount that IC contributes to 
shareholder value 
IC contribution to shareholder value Percentage of respondents (n=93)
0% to 25% 19%
26% to 50% 24%
51% to 75% 26%
76% to 100% 31%
The remainder of the evidence presented in this section addresses 
Research Question 1.
RQ1: What is the view of finance directors regarding the relative importance 
of the various components of IC that have been identified in the academic 
literature in the generation of company value?
IC appears to be viewed in the academic literature as a hierarchy of 
nested concepts, with high-level categories such as human, structural and 
relational capital having multiple lower-level components.  Beattie and 
Thomson (2004) identified a total of 128 lower level IC components 
from a detailed content analysis of the IC literature.  Although many 
terms identified might be judged synonymous, IC appears to be a broad 
concept.  According to Mouritsen (2003), the boundary around the IC 
construct is not clear.  The link between the corporate value creation 
process and the various IC components is also unclear and potentially 
situation-specific.  Consequently, respondents were asked their views in 
relation to the relative contribution of various IC components to the 
generation of value for their companies.  
Aggregate responses are shown in Table 4.2 in descending rank 
order where: 1= no contribution; 2 = weak contribution; 3 = moderate 
contribution; 4 = strong contribution; and 5 = very strong contribution. 
Percentages may not total 100% as the ‘don’t know’ category in this 
47reSultS: QueStionnaire reSponSeS and interviewS with Finance directorS
and other tables is not shown.  For the sake of brevity, the average score 
is shown in the second last column and the consensus or extent of 
agreement among respondents is categorised as high, medium or low 
based on the standard deviation of responses.  
The average score for all IC components was significantly different 
from one, i.e. no contribution at all.  This appears to suggest that all of 
the IC components investigated contribute to company value to some 
degree.  ‘Customer relationships’, with an average score of 4.14, was 
viewed as providing the most contribution with 81% of respondents 
indicating it provided a strong or very strong contribution to company 
value.  This was closely followed by ‘employee skills and education’ with 
an average score of 4.11 and 84% of respondents indicating a strong 
or very strong contribution.  ‘Competitive edge in terms of quality of 
product/service’ and ‘company reputation’ were considered third and 
fourth in terms of their contribution to company value respectively, 
with average scores of 4.08 and 4.05.  There appears to be a higher level 
of consensus with respect to the contribution made by ‘employee skills 
and education’ and ‘company reputation’.  
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Table 4.2 The views of finance directors regarding the relative 
importance of the various components of IC to generating 
company value (n=93)
To what extent do the following 
IC components contribute to 
creating value for your company?
Response category1
percentage of respondents Average 
score Consensus21 2 3 4 5
Customer relationships 2 1 15 44 37 4.14 Medium
Employee skills and education 1 3 12 51 33 4.11 High
Competitive edge in terms of 
quality of product/service 1 3 19 40 36 4.08 Medium
Company reputation 0 2 25 38 35 4.05 High
Innovation 3 10 18 39 29 3.82 Medium
Development of products/ideas 3 11 23 35 28 3.74 Medium
Data/knowledge of customers  3 8 29 46 12 3.57 Medium
Intellectual property 4 22 20 29 25 3.49 Low
Employee training and 
development 2 11 28 52 5 3.47 High
Brand names 8 10 27 41 14 3.44 Medium
Financial resources (assuming no 
financial distress) 2 9 40 41 8 3.43 High
Competitive edge in terms of 
adaptability of business practices 2 19 31 37 11 3.36 Medium
Relationship between employees 
and management 5 11 36 35 11 3.36 Medium
Competitive edge in terms of cost 
of product/service 2 19 35 29 14 3.34 Medium
Distribution channels 11 16 21 35 16 3.28 Low
Business processes 6 12 46 32 4 3.18 Medium
Low level of employee turnover 5 20 37 30 8 3.14 Medium
Market share 9 22 29 27 13 3.14 Low
Marketing strategies 9 20 26 38 7 3.13 Medium
Organisation infrastructure 5 15 43 34 2 3.12 Medium
Supplier relationships 8 20 42 24 6 3.02 Medium
Organisational development 6 20 48 25 1 2.97 High
Competitive edge in terms of the 
timing of product/service release 6 33 25 27 6 2.93 Medium
Relationship with the media 17 27 36 14 6 2.63 Medium
Relationship with the community 21 27 33 12 6 2.56 Low
Relationship with the government 23 29 23 19 5 2.54 Low
Relationships with creditors 
(assuming no financial distress) 16 40 35 8 1 2.40 Medium
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Notes
1. Response categories are: 1=no contribution, 2=weak contribution, 3=moderate contribution, 
4=strong contribution, 5=very strong contribution.  
2. Consensus is based on standard deviation (sd) of responses classified as follows: sd less than or 
equal to 0.85 = high; sd greater than 0.85 and less than or equal to 1.10 = medium; sd greater 
than 1.10 = low.
‘Relationships with creditors’ were viewed as providing the least 
contribution to company value with an average score of 2.4 and 56% 
of respondents indicating it provided no contribution or only a weak 
contribution.  Relationships with the government, the community and 
the media were also viewed to provide low contribution with average 
scores of 2.54, 2.56 and 2.63 respectively.  However, there was a lack 
of consensus in relation to the contribution of relationships with the 
community and government, implying that these factors may well be 
company-specific and important if operating in certain sectors.  The 
contribution of ‘intellectual property’ and ‘distribution channels’ 
also appears to vary markedly across companies.  Approximately 
26% indicated that ‘intellectual property’ provided no or only weak 
contribution whereas 54% indicated it provided a strong or very strong 
contribution.  Similarly, 27% indicated that ‘distribution channels’ 
provided no or only weak contribution whereas 51% indicated it 
provided a strong or very strong contribution.  Respondents appeared 
to be more in agreement in relation to the contribution of ‘employee 
training and development’, ‘financial resources’, and ‘organisational 
development’.  
To further investigate the IC concept, finance director interviewees 
were asked to sum up what IC means to their companies.  The 
contribution of employee skills (human capital) to creating company 
value was reinforced by the interviews:
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We’re a high technology business and therefore the skill base in our 
engineers and the knowledge base of our engineers is what sustains 
the business.  [FD1] 
The only assets we have in our business are our people... our main 
route to market is a combination of our people and their ability 
to convince clients.  [FD5] 
It [IC] means its [the company’s] relationships built up around 
its people.  [FD6]
Our business is about the people and the decisions our people 
make... all our revenue is generated by the sort of intellectual 
capital of the employees.  [FD8]
Innovation and product development also featured strongly in the 
interviews.  The importance of a research and development ‘pipeline’ 
was evident in the following response:
There’s lots of research, it’s huge... some of that is pure research.  
Part of it is developing products through trials, and part of it 
is supporting products that have already come to market and 
extending their life cycles... which drives the value of the company.  
[FD2]
It is apparent that the IC concept is not always considered in terms 
of the individual components that create value.  A number of companies 
appeared to focus on how the components come together under a strategy 
for creating company value.  This supports Habersam and Piper (2003) 
who empirically identify connectivity capital as a linking pin between 
human, structural and relational capital.
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We wouldn’t dissect it like that.  [FD4]
We only sell as much as we sell and export as much as we export 
because we’ve created leading edge technology products and services 
and capability, so it’s all important to us.  [FD1]
It’s around the expertise of management... a lot of what we do as a 
regulated utility... is to do with customer service standards... How 
your reputation is gained or lost is a lot to do with ethics and values 
and integrity within the business.  [FD3]
We win and retain work on the basis of the way we do the work, 
which is about how the company does business, and the people in 
the company’s understanding of what the client requires.  [FD7]
Mouritsen et al. (2001) highlight the transformation of human 
capital into structural capital in the value creation process.  This was 
evident from the interview responses:
All our products are based on years of research and developed 
knowledge and for everything practically we sell, we depend on 
patenting and protecting that knowledge.  [FD2]
However, it would appear that despite taking protective steps, 
companies are still very much reliant on the human contribution; with 
75% of questionnaire respondents viewing a low level of employee 
turnover to provide a moderate to very strong contribution to company 
value:
You can have all kind of intellectual property protections you want 
but basically the knowledge is in the people and therefore our ability 
to retain those people is really key.  [FD1]   
52 intellectual capital reporting: academic utopia or corporate reality in a Brave new world?
There’s a lot of intellectual capital within individuals... our business 
model is very much geared around trying to retain and motivate 
those individuals... to make it a compelling proposition for them 
to stay with us.  [FD10]
Incentives and disincentives in relation to IC 
disclosure
RQ3a: What is the relative importance of the various incentives and 
disincentives in relation to the IC disclosure decision?
There are various theoretical incentives to voluntarily disclose IC 
information.  For example, IC reporting provides companies with the 
opportunity to increase their transparency to capital markets, to establish 
trustworthiness with stakeholders and employ a valuable marketing 
tool (Van der Meer-Kooistra and Zijlstra, 2001).  Respondents were, 
therefore, asked their views in relation to the relative importance of 
various incentives in relation to the disclosure of IC information. 
Aggregate responses are shown in Table 4.3, in descending rank order, 
where: 1= not important at all; 2 = of little importance; 3 = fairly 
important; 4 = important; and 5 = very important.
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Table 4.3 The views of finance directors regarding the incentives to 
voluntarily disclose IC information (n=93)
How important are the following 
incentives in relation to your 





score Consensus21 2 3 4 5
Helping to correct an undervalued 
share price 5 8 28 43 16 3.57 Medium
Increasing the predictability of our  
future prospects 4 18 38 30 10 3.23 Medium
Promoting a reputation for 
transparent/accurate reporting 9 15 29 41 6 3.19 Medium
Increasing price/earnings ratio 13 16 22 35 11 3.15 Low
Reducing the ‘information risk’ 
that investors assign to our stock 9 20 37 28 6 3.03 Medium
Increasing the overall liquidity of 
our stock 11 27 21 33 7 2.97 Low
Attracting more financial analysts 
to follow our shares 16 20 28 28 8 2.90 Low
Providing important information 
to investors that is not included in 
mandatory financial disclosures 10 23 37 28 1 2.80 Medium
Providing a valuable marketing tool 11 31 27 29 2 2.80 Medium
Revealing to outsiders the skill 
level of our managers 12 27 38 17 6 2.79 Medium
Reducing cost of capital 17 23 28 26 4 2.77 Low
Helping to create trustworthiness 
with customers 17 31 23 25 4 2.70 Low
Helping to create trustworthiness 
with other stakeholders 17 24 34 24 1 2.69 Medium
Helping to create trustworthiness 
with employees 18 32 28 19 3 2.58 Medium
Avoiding allegations of insufficient 
disclosure 18 36 30 14 2 2.48 Medium
As a motivation for employees 21 29 34 14 2 2.48 Medium
Demonstrating good employee 
relations 20 32 36 11 1 2.42 Medium
Helping to create trustworthiness 
with suppliers 21 36 28 14 1 2.38 Medium
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Notes
1. Response categories are: 1=not important at all, 2=of little importance, 3=fairly important, 
4=important, 5=very important.
2. Consensus based on standard deviation (sd) of responses classified as follows: sd less than or 
equal to 0.85 = high; sd greater than 0.85 and less than or equal to 1.10 = medium; sd greater 
than 1.10 = low.
The average score for all incentives to voluntarily disclose IC 
information was significantly different from one, i.e. not important 
at all.  This suggests that all of the reasons investigated provide an 
incentive to some degree.  The opportunity to increase transparency 
to capital markets in terms of ‘helping to correct an undervalued share 
price’ ranked significantly higher than all other incentives.  ‘Increasing 
the predictability of future prospects’, another incentive relating to 
transparency, ranked second with an average score of 3.23.  A further 
three capital market-related incentives were, on average, at least fairly 
important (score in excess of 3.00): ‘promoting a reputation for 
transparent/accurate reporting’; ‘increasing price/earnings ratio’; and 
‘reducing the information risk that investors assign to our stock’.  These 
findings support those of Graham et al. (2005), where US executives 
were found to make voluntary disclosure to reduce information risk 
and boost stock price.
Elliot and Jacobson (1994) suggest that increased transparency to 
capital markets leads to a lower cost of capital.  Findings appear to suggest 
a lack of consensus across companies with only 58% of respondents 
indicating that reducing ‘cost of capital’ (average score 2.77) was fairly 
to very important.  This coincides with previous interview evidence 
from UK finance directors.  Armitage and Marston (2007) also found 
a lack of consensus across companies with cost of capital considerations 
not the main determinant of corporate disclosure.  They reported that 
a reputation for openness was one of the main benefits of voluntary 
disclosure.  In the present study, ‘promoting a reputation for transparent 
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and accurate reporting’ was cited by 76% of respondents as being a fairly 
to very important incentive to voluntarily disclosing IC information.
Marketing-related incentives generally ranked lower than capital 
market-related incentives.  ‘Providing a valuable marketing tool’ scored 
2.8 and ‘helping to create trustworthiness with customers’ scored 2.70. 
This could be considered somewhat surprising given that customer 
relationships were viewed as contributing the most to company value 
and this was further explored during the interviews.  
Finally, human capital-related incentives ranked even lower.  Despite 
the strong contribution of human capital to company value, none of the 
three human capital-related incentives was widely viewed as important: 
‘helping to create trustworthiness with employees’; ‘as a motivation for 
employees’; and ‘demonstrating good employee relationships’ (average 
scores of 2.58, 2.48 and  2.42, respectively).  
‘Helping to create trustworthiness with suppliers’ was considered 
the least important incentive to IC disclosure, with 57% indicating 
it was either not important or of little importance (mean score 2.38).
The capital market incentives to voluntarily disclose IC information 
are further emphasised in the interview responses: 
The attitude of our senior management is to maintain clear 
communication with our investors so that there are no surprises... 
they want our share price to correctly value the business... it’s a very 
different culture from some aggressive corporates of the past where 
communication has been about enhancing share price beyond 
what it should be.  [FD2]
We do pride ourselves on being, within reason, as transparent as 
possible to the market, and we hope that stands us in good stead, 
in terms of the value that the market attributes to us.  [FD4]
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From the interview evidence it was apparent that communicating IC 
information to customers and other stakeholders was very important to 
certain companies in terms of reputation.  The nature of their business 
encouraged disclosure in order to appear legitimate and ethical.
We get attacked by various pressure groups outside the organisation 
saying [the nature of our business] is unethical.  We have put it 
[ethics]   higher up on the corporate agenda.  We engage now you 
know, and we listen and... we change.  In the early 90’s the test 
was if it’s legal that’s alright.  The test isn’t that anymore, the test is 
how would it read on the front page of the Daily Mail, and would 
I be happy explaining this to my mum? The test for all businesses 
is much different from where the law sits... so you end up having 
to try and inform all those opinion formers.  [FD1]
It still comes back to the whole ethos around, is a company acting 
responsible?... if a company was not to include details of its 
corporate social responsibility values, actions, processes, things that 
it’s doing, things that it’s doing to address problems from climate 
change, would that affect the investor base? Well it might do.  It 
still comes back to... investing in that company because it knows 
what it is doing and it’s taking its responsibilities seriously.  [FD3]
Approximately 42% of questionnaire responses indicated that 
IC disclosure was not important or of little importance in providing 
a valuable marketing tool.  An interviewee employed in the financial 
services industry offered one potential explanation:
We’re not allowed to market... we cannot market... we need to be 
careful on our annual report about marketing... the FSA could 
clamp down on us and say you are marketing to the general public... 
talking up [your] products too much.  [FD8] 
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The impact of regulations on marketing and promotion in other 
industry sectors was also raised:
The promotion and marketing of medicines is something that’s very 
regulated... legal obligations in terms of selling and marketing and 
promotion of our products... makes it different.  [FD2] 
Despite the apparent lack of importance placed on suppliers in the 
questionnaire responses, the incentive to disclose to suppliers did feature 
in several interviews:
For suppliers we need them to work in a way we want them to, 
they’re representing us.  We need them to understand how we want 
to work and why.  Actually we need them to understand what 
[the company’s] intellectual capital is, why it’s different.  [FD7]   
We said to him [our most critical supplier] this is what our 
strategy is, this is where we’re trying to take our business.  So in 
that regard, I guess we were giving him a sense of our IC.  [FD4]
Suppliers... just need to understand what we are doing, what 
drives us.  It is much easier for them to supply us with what we 
really need, rather than what they think we might want.  [FD11]
However, one particular interviewee actually perceived IC disclosure 
to suppliers as a disincentive:
In some ways you don’t want to share too much with the supplier 
in case they try to sort of find a way around it, or sell directly to 
the customer rather than through us.  [FD9]
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Respondents were asked their views in relation to the relative 
importance of a range of disincentives to the disclosure of IC information. 
Aggregate responses are shown in Table 4.4, in descending rank order.
The average score for all disincentives to voluntary disclose IC 
information was significantly different from one, i.e. not important at 
all.  This suggests that all of the reasons investigated offer a disincentive 
to some degree.  ‘Avoiding giving away “company secrets” or otherwise 
harming competitive position’ appears to be the most important 
with 60% of respondents indicating it was either important or very 
important.  The average score of 3.66 is statistically significantly different 
from the other disincentives (z = 2.115, p = 0.034, Wilcoxon Mann-
Whitney signed ranks test).  However, the consensus in responses is 
low, being not important or of little importance to 14% of respondents, 
suggesting that this factor is particularly industry- or company-specific. 
‘Preventing the creation of unrealistic expectations’ was ranked next in 
terms of importance (average score 3.41) followed by ‘avoiding setting 
a disclosure precedent’ (average score 3.16).  Both of these disincentives 
were statistically significantly different from the next highest ranking 
item.  Graham et al. (2005) noted, in their US study, the importance 
of avoiding the setting of disclosure precedents which are difficult to 
maintain.  Further, Unerman et al. (2007) also found UK companies to 
be concerned that investors and analysts would develop overly optimistic/
pessimistic expectations in response to IC disclosure.  ‘Avoiding potential 
follow-up questions’ and ‘avoiding attracting unwanted scrutiny by 
regulators’ were, on balance, considered the least important disincentives 
to voluntarily disclosing IC information with average scores of 2.52 and 
2.62, respectively.
59reSultS: QueStionnaire reSponSeS and interviewS with Finance directorS
Table 4.4 The views of finance directors regarding the disincentives to 
voluntarily disclose IC information (n=93)
How important are the following 
disincentives in relation to your 





score Consensus21 2 3 4 5
Avoiding giving away “company secrets” or 
otherwise harming our competitive position 7 7 26 35 25 3.66 Low
Preventing the creation of unrealistic 
expectations 9 10 24 45 12 3.41 Low
Avoiding setting a disclosure precedent 8 19 30 34 8 3.16 Medium
Reducing the costs of collecting information 10 24 40 22 3 2.85 Medium
Avoiding possible lawsuits if future results 
don’t match forward-looking disclosures 16 28 23 19 12 2.84 Low
Reduce the costs of obtaining auditor 
opinion in relation to consistency with 
financial statements 16 21 38 18 7 2.77 Low
Avoiding attracting unwanted scrutiny by 
the media 11 37 24 22 6 2.74 Medium
Reducing the costs of disseminating 
information 12 28 38 19 2 2.71 Medium
Avoiding attracting unwanted scrutiny by 
regulators 19 31 26 19 5 2.62 Low
Avoiding potential follow-up questions 
about unimportant items 18 34 29 16 3 2.52 Medium
Notes
1. Response categories are: 1=not important at all, 2=of little importance, 3=fairly important, 
4=important, 5=very important.  
2. Consensus is based on standard deviation (sd) of responses classified as follows: sd less than or 
equal to 0.85 = high sd greater than 0.85 and less than or equal to 1.10 = medium; sd greater 
than 1.10 = low.
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The importance of maintaining competitive position dominated 
interview responses:
I’ll describe it [processes, our life cycle, management process] 
in the generality to investors but the forms we use and how we 
go about this is proprietary so we keep it... The sector is prone to 
industrial espionage by nations, not necessarily by individuals but 
by nations.  [FD1]
We find ourselves in the fortunate position where we are probably 
sort of number one or number two in most of the markets we operate 
in... so we set the precedent for the development of the market... so 
we don’t want to give too much of what we are trying to achieve 
to our competitors.  [FD4]
If you disclose exactly it would erode your competitive advantage, 
because we would read all our competitors stuff and find out what 
they do, to take the best bits from it.  [FD7]
I think it needs to be recognised in financial reporting that there is 
a fundamental conflict between confidentiality and competitively 
sensitive information, and providing information to investors... 
investors want to know what that is [competitive advantage] 
because that helps them to value the business, but competitors want 
to know... in order that they can knock it down and get around 
it somehow.  [FD9]
However, competitive disadvantage is not always a disincentive 
to IC disclosure.  In the utilities industry, it appears more a matter 
of collaboration than harming competitive position, reinforcing the 
suggestion that IC and its’ disclosure are very much situation specific:  
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You pick up a lot of sort of industry intelligence... from quite a 
large number of operating groups that work across the industry.  
...quite a number [of companies] on different topics collaborate, 
work together to try and understand different customer issues, 
operational problems.  I am not sure you’d get that in a more 
competitive world where people do compete for products.  [FD3]
Comments by several interviewees and questionnaire respondents 
also indicated that a disincentive to voluntarily disclose IC information 
was the difficulty in measurement and the degree of subjectivity involved. 
For example:
Impossible to quantify IC in any meaningful manner... risk of 
confusing reader of accounts even further by providing more 
complex subjective information, the potential impact of which is 
unclear.  [FD9]
Disclosure decisions and the category of IC information 
RQ3b: How do the incentives and disincentives of IC disclosure relate to the 
three IC categories (human, structural and relational capital)?
Respondents were asked to indicate the three most important 
incentives and disincentives in relation to the disclosure of each of 
human capital, structural capital and relational capital information. 
The most important incentive for disclosing human capital information 
was ‘helping to create trustworthiness with employees’ (cited by 13 
respondents); whereas the most important incentive for disclosing both 
structural and relational capital was ‘helping to correct an undervalued 
share price’ (cited by 14 respondents and 11 respondents, respectively). 
The number of cites received for each incentive, aggregated across the 
top three slots (most important, second most important and third 
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most important incentive), is summarised in Table 4.5 according to the 
category of IC information being disclosed.  In this table, incentives 
are ordered as for Table 4.3 (ranked in order of importance for total IC 
disclosure) and the incentives having the five highest number of cites 
for each IC category are shaded to facilitate interpretation.
This question reinforces the importance of ‘helping to correct an 
undervalued share price’ the top ranking item in Table 4.3.  This is the 
only incentive to feature in the top five for all three IC categories and 
it receives the highest number of cites for both structural and relational 
capital.  However, this capital market incentive along with four other 
capital market incentives dominates the incentives for the disclosure 
of structural capital information.  In contrast, the disclosure of human 
and relational capital, in addition to capital market incentives, is due 
to incentives related to the nature of the information being disclosed.
Human capital appears to be predominantly disclosed in order 
to ‘motivate’ and ‘help to create trustworthiness with employees’ (29 
combined cites across the top three slots and 26 combined cites across 
the top three slots, respectively).  ‘Demonstrating good employee 
relations’ (21 combined cites) and ‘revealing to outsiders the skill level 
of managers’ (18 combined cites) also appear important.  Additional 
important incentives for the disclosure of relational capital include 
‘helping to create trustworthiness with customers’ (21 combined cites) 
and ‘providing a valuable marketing tool’ (16 combined cites).  A capital-
market related incentive ‘attracting more financial analysts to follow our 
shares’ (14 combined cites) is also a top five item.
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Table 4.5 The views of finance directors on the three most important 
incentives for voluntarily disclosing IC information (n=93)








Helping to correct an undervalued share price 24 37 25
Increasing the predictability of our  future 
prospects 8 16 12
Promoting a reputation for transparent/accurate 
reporting 6 21 14
Increasing price/earnings ratio 16 30 18
Reducing the ‘information risk’ that investors 
assign to our stock 5 9 12
Increasing the overall liquidity of our stock 4 9 4
Attracting more financial analysts to follow our 
shares 6 12 14
Providing important information to investors 
that is not included in mandatory financial 
disclosures 6 7 5
Providing a valuable marketing tool 7 6 16
Revealing to outsiders the skill level of our 
managers 18 6 9
Reducing cost of capital 7 15 6
Helping to create trustworthiness with customers 9 6 21
Helping to create trustworthiness with other 
stakeholders 4 4 15
Helping to create trustworthiness with employees 26 4 3
Avoiding allegations of insufficient disclosure 1 4 5
As a motivation for employees 29 2 2
Demonstrating good employee relations 21 1 1
Helping to create trustworthiness with suppliers 1 4 12
Notes
1. Number of respondents citing the incentive as either the most important, second most important 
or third most important incentive.
2. The incentives with the five highest number of cites are shaded to facilitate interpretation.  Six 
incentives are shaded for relational capital  as there are two incentives which have the 5th highest 
number of cites (14 cites).  
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The most important disincentive for disclosing human capital, 
structural capital and relational capital was ‘avoiding giving away 
“company secrets” or otherwise harming competitive position’ (cited 
by 28, 29 and 26 respondents, respectively).  The number of cites 
received for each disincentive across the top three slots (most important, 
second most important and third most important) are summarised in 
Table 4.6 according to the category of IC information being disclosed. 
The three disincentives having the highest number of cites have been 
shaded.  Other important disincentives appear to be ‘preventing the 
creation of unrealistic expectations’ and ‘avoiding setting a disclosure 
precedent’.  The importance attached to disincentives does not appear 
to vary significantly across the different categories of IC information.
Table 4.6 The views of finance directors on three most important 
disincentives for voluntarily disclosing IC information 
(n=93)
Disincentives







Avoiding giving away “company secrets” or 
otherwise harming our competitive position 38 37 35
Preventing the creation of unrealistic expectations 24 22 30
Avoiding setting a disclosure precedent 25 23 20
Reducing the costs of collecting information 15 15 14
Avoiding possible lawsuits if future results don’t 
match forward-looking disclosures 13 18 15
Reduce the costs of obtaining auditor opinion in 
relation to consistency with financial statements 4 10 7
Avoiding attracting unwanted scrutiny by the 
media 14 12 19
Reducing the costs of disseminating information 7 7 3
Avoiding attracting unwanted scrutiny by 
regulators 11 14 18
Avoiding potential follow-up questions about 
unimportant items 9 6 9
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Notes
1. Number of respondents citing the disincentive as either the most important, second most 
important or third most important disincentive.
2. The disincentives with the three highest number of cites are shaded to facilitate interpretation.
Overall, the evidence clearly indicates that the incentives for IC 
disclosure relate differently to the three IC categories.  Thus, a substantial 
part of the observed variation in the importance of various incentives 
can be attributed to situation-specific variations in the importance of the 
main IC categories and their constituent components.  In contrast, the 
disincentives for IC disclosure appear to be generic in nature, applying 
to all company situations in a similar way.
Communication channels and the category of IC 
information 
RQ4a: How effective are the various forms of communication in relation to 
the disclosure of the three IC categories (human, structural and relational 
capital)?
Prior research has investigated alternative means of communicating 
both information in general (McInnes et al., 2007), and IC information 
(Unerman et al., 2007) to various stakeholders.  McInnes et al. (2007, 
pp.116-121) develop a model of stakeholder uptake of information 
packages and communications channels that highlights the impact 
of channel attributes, stakeholder characteristics and communication 
roles.  Prior research in relation to the means of communicating the 
different categories of IC information (human, structural and relational 
capital) appears somewhat limited.  Respondents were, therefore, 
asked their views in relation to the effectiveness of various forms of 
communication in relation to the disclosure of human, structural and 
relational capital information.  Aggregate responses are shown in Table 
4.7 where: 1= effective; 2 = neutral; 3 = ineffective.  The consensus or 
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extent of agreement among respondents is categorised as high, medium 
or low based on the standard deviation of responses.  The final column 
indicates whether the communication channel is viewed as effective or 
ineffective, based on whether the average score is statistically significantly 
different from neutral.  
 
Table 4.7 The views of finance directors regarding IC and forms of 
communication (n=93)
Panel A: Human capital disclosure
Rate the following channels for your 










of response3 1 2 3
1-1 meetings with investors 61 28 11 1.51 Medium Effective
1-1 meetings with analysts 61 26 13 1.53 Medium Effective
Investor presentations 57 29 14 1.56 Medium Effective
Annual corporate report 53 37 10 1.57 Medium Effective
Analyst presentations 54 28 18 1.64 Low Effective
Company web pages 51 34 15 1.64 Medium Effective
Field visits with existing/potential 
institutional investors 54 27 19 1.66 Low Effective
Annual review 30 51 19 1.89 Medium Neutral
Company newsletters 30 41 29 1.99 Medium Neutral
Press releases 25 47 28 2.03 Medium Neutral
Corporate social responsibility report 32 32 36 2.05 Low Neutral
Preliminary report 23 47 30 2.07 Medium Neutral
Interim report 18 48 34 2.16 Medium Ineffective
Conference calls 14 45 41 2.26 Medium Ineffective
67reSultS: QueStionnaire reSponSeS and interviewS with Finance directorS
Table 4.7 The views of finance directors regarding IC and forms of 
communication (n=93) (Cont.)
Panel B: Structural capital disclosure
Rate the following channels for 










of response3 1 2 3
1-1 meetings with investors 62 32 6 1.44 High Effective
1-1 meetings with analysts 60 34 6 1.46 High Effective
Investor presentations 61 32 7 1.46 High Effective
Analyst presentations 56 36 8 1.52 High Effective
Annual corporate report 52 42 6 1.54 High Effective
Field visits with existing/potential 
institutional investors 49 39 12 1.63 Medium Effective
Company web pages 47 43 10 1.64 Medium Effective
Annual review 27 58 14 1.87 High Effective
Press releases 27 49 24 1.98 Medium Neutral
Preliminary report 24 51 25 2.01 Medium Neutral
Company newsletters 22 41 37 2.14 Low Ineffective
Interim report 16 52 32 2.15 Medium Ineffective
Corporate social responsibility 
report 15 47 38 2.23 Medium Ineffective
Conference calls 16 43 41 2.26 Medium Ineffective
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Table 4.7 The views of finance directors regarding IC and forms of 
communication (n=93) (Cont.)
Panel C: Relational capital disclosure
Rate the following channels for your 










of response3 1 2 3
1-1 meetings with investors 58 32 10 1.53 Medium Effective
Investor presentations 57 30 13 1.55 Medium Effective
1-1 meetings with analysts 54 33 13 1.59 Medium Effective
Analyst presentations 51 35 14 1.63 Medium Effective
Field visits with existing/potential 
institutional investors 50 37 13 1.63 Medium Effective
Annual corporate report 46 41 13 1.67 Medium Effective
Company web pages 42 46 12 1.70 Medium Effective
Annual review 26 61 13 1.87 High Effective
Press releases 25 55 20 1.94 Medium Neutral
Preliminary report 24 49 27 2.04 Medium Neutral
Interim report 19 49 32 2.14 Medium Ineffective
Corporate social responsibility report 20 41 39 2.18 Medium Ineffective
Conference calls 16 45 39 2.23 Medium Ineffective
Company newsletters 18 39 43 2.24 Medium Ineffective
Notes
1. Response categories are: 1=effective, 2=neutral, 3=ineffective.
2. Consensus is based on standard deviation of less than or equal to 0.65 = high; standard deviation 
of greater than 0.65 and less than or equal to 0.75 = medium; standard deviation of greater 
than 0.75 = low.
3. Based on statistical test (t-test) to identify if average scores are significantly different from 
2-neutral.
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Prior research (Unerman et al., 2007) has found that individual 
meetings with investors and analysts are viewed as the most effective 
means of communicating IC information.  The evidence in Table 
4.7 supports this finding and further shows that it holds across each 
category of IC.  The corporate annual report was considered effective in 
communicating human capital and structural capital by just over half of 
respondents; it was considered slightly less effective in communicating 
relational capital (46% of respondents indicated it was effective whilst 
13% indicated it was ineffective).  Seven forms of communication 
were viewed as effective for all three IC categories.  The top three for 
all IC categories were ‘1-1 meetings with investors’, ‘1-1 meetings with 
analysts’, and ‘investor presentations’.  
‘Field visits with existing or potential institutional investors’ 
and ‘analyst presentations’, although viewed as an effective means of 
communication across all IC categories, ranked slightly less highly in 
relation to communicating human capital.  Company web pages were 
viewed as effective by 51% of respondents in relation to human capital; 
47% in relation to structural capital and 42% in relation to relational 
capital.  The annual review was considered effective for only structural 
and relational capital.
Company newsletters and the corporate social responsibility report 
were viewed as ineffective for communicating structural and relational 
capital, however they were considered neutral for human capital. 
Press releases and preliminary reports were viewed as neutral channels 
for communicating information about all categories of IC.  Interim 
reports and conference calls were viewed as ineffective channels for 
communicating information about all categories of IC.
The effectiveness of the various channels of communication was 
further explored in the interviews.  According to one finance director: 
They [channels of communication] all have their place.  [FD7]
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However, the importance of face-to-face contact with various 
stakeholders over written communication was a widespread view: 
Shareholders are buying the future based on past records, the 
“story”, and management credibility.  The latter two are best done 
in presentations/face-to-face – not in a document.  [CFO of an 
AIM company responding to the questionnaire]
The best communication is face-to-face communication... certainly 
our internal employee opinion surveys tell us.  [FD1]
You need to see the energy and the interplay, because then you get 
people coming away just feeling that lots of people felt confident... 
it is as much in our body language as anything else.  [FD11]
You can use the presentation as a discussion ...allows them 
[investors] to draw conclusions about what you expect to happen 
and it allows you to bring out the messages you think are important.  
[FD7]
It is very hard to do that [effective communication] in writing 
in a way people can actually understand or see it.  You haven’t got 
the props and you can’t do the demonstrations.  [FD11]
Face-to-face channels were thought to be especially important 
in communicating human capital information so recipients could 
experience and observe senior management first hand:
Human capital... I think it is always going to be easier [to 
communicate] face-to-face.  It’s intangible and different things 
to different people and a very difficult thing to get across.  In the 
direct conversation you can be more expansive.  [FD10]
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Opinion in relation to the effectiveness of the corporate annual 
report was somewhat mixed.  Its use as a communication channel is 
explored further in the next section.
I do you know [think the annual report is an effective channel 
for communicating IC information], I meet the investors, clearly 
lots of them read it.  [FD1] 
Those that want to read it [annual report] will do, but I think 
they’re few in number actually.  People... are swayed more by what 
gets in the press and the media than anything else.  [FD3]    
Several interviewees remarked on the use of company newsletters, 
despite the fact that questionnaire respondents considered them neutral 
for communicating human capital information and ineffective for 
structural and relational capital.  The use of websites for communicating 
human capital information was also commented on.
We send out monthly newsletters that go out to our existing clients.  
Weekly updates as well and they’re effective ways of communicating 
with stakeholders.  [FD8]
Company magazines, they’re also another really good communication 
channel... it’s in the waiting room downstairs, it’s all over the place.  
[FD1]
You’ve got the investor site [website] that you need a log-in to get 
into... actually there it talks about human capital.  [FD8]
IC disclosure and the annual report
RQ4b: In what way is the annual report used as a vehicle for IC disclosure?
72 intellectual capital reporting: academic utopia or corporate reality in a Brave new world?
The corporate annual report remains a key reporting document 
(for example, see the literature summarised in Beattie, 1999, p.24). 
Respondents were, therefore, asked the extent of their agreement with 
statements in relation to IC disclosure in the annual corporate report. 
Aggregate responses are shown in Table 4.8 in descending order of 
agreement where: 1 = strongly disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = neutral; 4 = 
agree; 5 = strongly agree.  The average score is shown in the second last 
column and the consensus or extent of agreement among respondents 
is categorised as high, medium or low based on the standard deviation 
of responses.  
Table 4.8 The views of finance directors regarding IC disclosure in the 
annual corporate report (n=93)
To what extent do you agree with the 
following statements in relation to IC 
disclosure in the annual corporate report 
of your company?
Response category1
percentage of respondents Average 
score Consensus21 2 3 4 5
The annual report is useful for 
communicating basic IC information for 
stakeholders less familiar with the business 2 6 17 60 13 3.78 High
Investors would become concerned if 
important ‘new’ IC information was 
released in the annual report instead of on 
a more timely basis 4 10 18 44 18 3.64 Medium
The annual report is used as an important 
and credible source of reference, to confirm 
IC information provided via other sources 3 9 27 48 8 3.51 Medium
IC information in the annual report  
confirms information previously released 
to the stock market via other sources 6 17 17 45 13 3.45 Low
IC information is presented or packaged in 
a different manner in different channels of 
communication 2 17 33 39 3 3.26 Medium
The annual report is useful for 
communicating complex IC information 
in narrative/quantitative form 6 23 27 40 3 3.12 Medium
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Notes
1. Response categories are: 1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neutral, 4=agree, 5=strongly agree.
2. Consensus is based on standard deviation (sd) of responses classified as follows: sd less than or 
equal to 0.85 = high; sd greater than 0.85 and less than or equal to 1.10 = medium; sd greater 
than 1.10 = low.
The annual report appears to be a relevant communication channel 
with approximately 73% of respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing 
that it ‘is useful in communicating basic IC information to less familiar 
stakeholders’ (average score of 3.78).  However, respondents were 
neutral (average score of 3.12 not statistically significantly different 
from 3-neutral) in relation to its usefulness for ‘communicating complex 
IC information’.  Further, the annual report’s general usefulness is 
questionable according to several interviewees:
For most investors it’s [annual report] just too big and unwieldy 
a document to read.  [FD7]
It comes back to the level of detail that’s in these documents now... 
it’s just a bit of an off-putting document by its sheer size.  [FD4]
One of the concerns I’ve got about annual reports is how big they’re 
getting and how complex they are... my gran down in Brighton, 
she’s not going to understand a lot of complex disclosures... it’s [the 
annual report] trying to achieve far too much for far too many 
people, and as a result it’s become a monster in terms of size.  [FD9]
A fog of subjective judgement... assumptions and voluminous 
‘boiler-plate’ disclosures.  [FD 9]
The annual report does not appear to be the first place where IC 
information is disclosed.  Approximately, 62% of respondents agreed 
or strongly agreed that ‘investors would become concerned if important 
‘new’ IC information was released in the annual report’ (average score 
3.64).  Further, 58% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that 
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‘IC information in the annual report confirms information previously 
released to the stock market via other sources’ (average score 3.45). 
Similarly, 56% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed the annual 
report’s role in confirming IC information provided via other sources 
(average score 3.51).  The main explanation appears to lie in the inability 
of the annual report to provide timely information.  As one interviewee 
put it:
Presentations and relationships with key investors are much more 
important than that [annual report]... because this [annual 
report] is basically old news by the time it’s published.  So 
there shouldn’t ever be anything in here [annual report] that is 
materially new news.  [FD2] 
From questionnaire responses presented in the previous section, it is 
apparent that various communication channels are used to communicate 
IC information.  Respondents were asked if IC information was presented 
or packaged in a different manner according to the communication 
channel being used.  There appears to be tentative agreement that this 
is indeed the case for a number of companies, with 40% in agreement 
or strong agreement (average score 3.26).  However, approximately 
19% of respondents disagreed and 33% were neutral inferring that an 
identical IC disclosure message is used across communication channels 
by some companies.  These findings were corroborated with the mixed 
views evident during interviews:
If you look at all our communications... there’s not one story for 
one lot over here, another lot for another or another, it’s all one 
and we have to work you know, really quite hard to make that 
the case.  [FD1]
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They [companies] perceive the user base of different channels [of 
communication] is different and that’s rightly so.  [FD6]
We will take the same piece of information and bundle it up a 
different way, in order to appeal to... or provide the information 
that that particular group of stakeholders needs.  [FD7]
Summary: finance directors’ views
The evidence presented in this chapter supports the following 
main findings regarding finance directors’ views in relation to IC and 
its disclosure: 
•	 RQ1: IC components – all of the IC components investigated 
contribute to company value to some degree.  ‘Customer 
relationships’, ‘employee skills and education’, ‘competitive edge in 
terms of quality of product/service’, and ‘company reputation’ were 
ranked the top four components in terms of their contribution. 
Of these top four components, three belong to the relational 
capital category of IC and one to the human capital category of 
IC.  There was evidence to suggest that companies take steps to 
protect their IC, however they continue to rely heavily on human 
capital which they try to retain.
•	 RQ3: Incentives to voluntarily disclose IC – all of the reasons 
investigated provide an incentive for the voluntarily disclosure 
of IC information to some degree.  Capital market incentives 
dominated the disclosure of IC information in general.  The 
opportunity to increase transparency to capital markets in terms of 
‘helping to correct an undervalued share price’ was more important 
than all other incentives.  ‘Increasing the predictability of our 
future prospects’ and ‘promoting a reputation for transparent/
accurate reporting’ were ranked second and third in importance, 
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respectively.  Incentives relate differently according to the category 
of IC information being disclosed.  ‘Helping to correct an 
undervalued share price’ was most important in the disclosure of 
both structural and relational capital, whereas ‘helping to create 
trustworthiness with employees’ was most important in the 
disclosure of human capital.  Capital market incentives dominate 
the disclosure of structural capital.  However, the disclosure of 
human and relational capital is also driven by incentives which 
relate to the category of information being disclosed.
•	 RQ3: Disincentives to voluntarily disclose IC – all of the reasons 
investigated provide a disincentive to the voluntarily disclosure of 
IC information to some degree.  ‘Avoiding giving away “company 
secrets” or otherwise harming competitive position’ was more 
important than all other disincentives.  However, competitive 
disadvantage is not always a disincentive to IC disclosure, 
suggesting that IC disclosure drivers are very much situation-
specific.  ‘Preventing the creation of unrealistic expectations’ and 
‘avoiding setting a disclosure precedent’ were ranked second and 
third in importance, respectively.  The importance attached to 
these disincentives does not vary significantly across the different 
categories of IC information.
•	 RQ4a: Communication channels – ‘one-to-one meetings with 
investors’, ‘one-to-one meetings with analysts’, and ‘investor 
presentations’ were the top three most effective communication 
channels for disclosing all categories of IC information.  Other 
channels of communication which were also effective across 
the three categories of IC include: ‘annual corporate report’, 
‘analyst presentations’, ‘company web pages’ and ‘field visits with 
existing/potential institutional investors’.  The ‘interim report’ 
and ‘conference calls’ were considered ineffective for disclosing 
all three IC categories.  ‘Company newsletters’ and the ‘corporate 
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social responsibility report’ were also considered ineffective for 
communicating structural and relational capital.
•	 RQ4b: IC disclosure in the corporate annual report – the annual 
report is useful in communicating basic IC information.  However, 
its usefulness for communicating complex IC information is not 
clear.  The annual report is not the first place where IC information 
is disclosed, rather it confirms information previously disclosed via 
other sources.  The ability of the annual report to provide timely 
information is a concern.  Companies use various channels to 
communicate IC information and a number of them appear to 
present or package the information in a different manner according 
to the communication channel being used.
The evidence in this chapter suggests that, although there are some 
common IC components and common incentives/disincentives to 
disclosure across companies, it is also very much company or situation-
specific.  There are differences in the importance of incentives according 
to which IC category is being disclosed.  Further, there are differences 
in the effectiveness of communication channels according to which 
category of IC information is being disclosed.  The IC concept and the 
IC disclosure decision means different things to different companies.  As 
one interviewee put it:
The IC components clearly constitute the essence of what a company 
‘is’, and every company has a unique mix of IC components.  [FD9]
 
5 results: QuestionnAire responses And interviews with humAn resources directors
Introduction
Human capital is one of the major categories of IC (Lev and Zambon, 
2003) and several empirical IC studies focus exclusively on human capital 
(Carr and O’Brien, 2008; Abeysekera, 2008; Ax and Morton, 2008; Lajili 
and Zéghal, 2005 and 2006; Abeysekera and Guthrie, 2004; ICAEW, 
2003).  Reporting Statement 1 (ASB, 2006) includes implementation 
guidance which recognises that employees may be a particularly key 
resource (and key risk) for many entities (para. 24).  Employee health 
and safety, recruitment and retention, training and development, 
motivation, and performance and profile are all highlighted as areas to be 
considered for reporting purposes (para. 26).  The individual components 
of human capital and their disclosure were investigated in greater detail 
than in chapter four by obtaining views and opinions from the human 
resources functional specialists across UK companies.  The findings from 
questionnaire responses and follow up interviews are presented in this 
chapter.  The next section considers the extent to which various human 
capital components contribute to company value.  The third section 
reports the extent to which various human capital components are used 
internally by management and disclosed externally.  The importance of 
various incentives and disincentives to the voluntary disclosure of human 
capital information externally is considered in the fourth section.  The 
fifth section considers the effectiveness of alternative channels of corporate 
communication for disclosing human capital externally.  A summary of 
human resources directors’ views is presented in the final section.
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Human capital contribution to corporate value
RQ1: What is the view of [human resources directors] regarding the relative 
importance of [eighteen human capital components] in the generation of 
company value?
Aggregate responses are shown in Table 5.1 in descending rank 
order where: 1= no contribution; 2 = weak contribution; 3 = moderate 
contribution; 4 = strong contribution; and 5 = very strong contribution. 
The average score is shown in the second last column and the consensus 
of responses (extent of agreement among respondents) is categorised 
as high, medium or low, based on the standard deviation of responses.
The average score for all human capital components was significantly 
different from one, i.e. no contribution at all.  This appears to suggest 
that all of the human capital components investigated contribute to 
company value to some degree.  ‘Employee skills and education’, with 
an average score of 4.46, appears to contribute to company value the 
most, with 91% of respondents indicating that it made a strong or very 
strong contribution.  Four other components also contribute to company 
value to a great extent: ‘employee commitment’; ‘positive employee 
attitudes’; ‘positive employee behaviour’; and ‘employee motivation. 
There is a high level of consensus regarding the importance of these 
top five components.  The next highest ranking component scores are 
significantly lower than these.
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Table 5.1 The views of human resources directors regarding the 
relative importance of the various components of human 
capital to generating company value (n=67)
To what extent do the following 
human capital components 
contribute to creating value for 
your company?
Response category1
percentage of respondents Average 
score Consensus21 2 3 4 5
Employee skills and education 0 0 9 35 56 4.46 High
Employee commitment 0 5 3 43 49 4.37 High
Positive employee attitudes 0 5 6 43 46 4.31 High
Positive employee behaviour 0 5 11 41 43 4.23 High
Employee motivation 0 5 11 43 41 4.22 High
Employee satisfaction 0 6 11 49 34 4.11 High
Good relations with company 
employees 0 3 18 45 34 4.09 High
Employee experience 0 3 17 51 28 4.05 High
Recruitment and selection 
procedures 0 3 17 54 26 4.03 High
Employee training and 
development 0 9 14 46 31 3.98 Medium
Employee adaptability 2 5 14 52 26 3.98 Medium
Workplace safety 3 9 20 23 45 3.97 Low
Employee reputation 3 12 22 31 30 3.73 Low
Employee remuneration 
procedures 1 5 31 48 15 3.71 High
Employee entrepreneurial skills 3 14 22 32 28 3.69 Low
Low level of employee turnover 0 8 29 55 8 3.63 High
Employee equality 3 17 26 28 26 3.57 Low
Promotion of employee welfare 1 20 34 31 14 3.35 Medium
Notes
1. Response categories are: 1=no contribution, 2=weak contribution, 3=moderate contribution, 
4=strong contribution, 5=very strong contribution.  
2. Standard deviation of less than or equal to 0.85 =high consensus; standard deviation of greater 
than 0.85 and less than or equal to 1.10 = medium consensus; standard deviation of greater 
than 1.10 = low consensus.
82 intellectual capital reporting: academic utopia or corporate reality in a Brave new world?
There appears to be less consensus regarding the contribution 
provided in relation to four components: ‘workplace safety’ (average 
score 3.97); ‘employee reputation’ (average score 3.73); ‘employee 
entrepreneurial skills’ (average score 3.69); and ‘employee equality’ 
(average score 3.57).  ‘Promotion of employee welfare’ appears to 
contribute the least to company value (average score 3.35), with 21% of 
respondents indicating it provided no or only weak contribution.  This 
score was significantly less than the next lowest score.
Employee skills and education featured prominently in the 
interviews, both from the company requirements and the individual 
employee perspective of the skills they need.
Human capital actually starts with the people that we have, the 
calibre of skills, competencies and experiences that they either bring 
with them or that they evolve and create by the type of work they 
do with us.  [HR2]
We have a whole pipeline of where we get employees from – 
everything from pre-graduate, post-graduate, PhD through to 
experienced hires.  We are looking for a breadth of technical skills... 
we are looking for hybrid skills from the employees.  [HR2]
We have an annual employee opinion survey... there will actually 
be questions asking employees did they think they have the right 
skills for the job.  [HR1]
The importance of bringing the skills of individuals together, rather 
than operating in isolation, to create value was strongly alluded to by 
both questionnaire respondents and interviewees:  
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Sales are made on the basis of the TEAM and its proven ability 
rather than a mere listing of which senior manager has which 
skills.  [questionnaire respondent]
The sum of the parts is greater than the individual... what we as 
individuals bring in to the work place; it is how that it is then 
mixed together like a cake, depends upon the actual output that 
you get.  [HR2]
However skills and education only appear to be of value if coupled 
with the ‘right’ attitude which translates into behaviour which is then a 
valuable contribution to the company.  The following quotations reflect 
the importance of transformations in relation to IC and value creation:
When we hire people we look for their potential... I have just 
recently come up with a model of what high potential looks like 
for us... ’three A model’... ability... ambition... and adaptability.  
Ability to do the job in terms of both commercial and relationship 
skills and then the two things that actually make a difference for 
high potential and realising that human capital is ambition, 
how much do people want to do with it; and adaptability, both 
in terms of technically... also in terms of business sense... globally 
mobile and culturally adaptive because the wider cross-section 
we have of clients, the more our people actually need to associate 
with that.  [HR2]
What you think you feel you do... so if people’s value sets are 
broadly similar... that throws through into behaviours.  It drives a 
collaborative environment so people team and pool their knowledge 
to create.  [HR2]
From the questionnaire responses, approximately 68% viewed 
‘workplace safety’ as providing a strong or very strong contribution to 
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the creation of company value.  However, one interviewee indicated 
that safety was not only a human capital consideration but also had 
implications for relational or structural capital in terms of brand name.
It [safety] is a fundamental commitment from the company for 
working in an environment.  It has an adverse impact on the 
brand if it is a big enough incident.  [HR2]
This serves to illustrate that an individual IC component can have 
impact on more than one main category of IC, indicating that synergies 
exist in operating human, structural and relational capital together, 
creating connectivity capital as termed by Habersam and Piper (2003).
The low consensus in questionnaire responses to the contribution 
to company value made by ‘employee entrepreneurial skills’ is somewhat 
surprising given employee skills, in general, and education ranked 
highest.  However, from interview responses it appears to very much 
depend on both the nature of the company and the employee’s function:
[Entrepreneurial skills contribute] in different ways, depending 
on the role somebody has.  [HR2] 
From an engineering perspective it [entrepreneurial skills] creates 
value because it is the creative spur that drives the innovation and 
effectively it is the innovation that we sell to customers.  If you look 
to the business development aspect, they carry our brand into new 
avenues, new markets.  [HR2]
It was recognised that not all roles require entrepreneurial skills to 
the same degree:
We are not a call centre where we need people going through things 
by rote and not using their imagination.  [HR2]
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Further, it was recognised that the entrepreneurial skills of 
individuals must be exercised and harnessed within organisational limits: 
It [the company] is a consultative environment.  So we need people 
to know their own minds, come to the table with what they have 
got, but operate within a box.  [HR2]
There was a high level of consensus regarding the importance 
of employee turnover – 84% of questionnaire respondents indicated 
that a ‘low level of employee turnover’ provided a moderate or strong 
contribution to company value, with only 8% rating it as very strong and 
8% as weak.  One of the interviewees commented on the costs involved 
in employee turnover.  Not only recruitment and selection costs but the 
induction process and how long it takes for an employee to get up to 
speed and delivering to the organisation.  
So the actual replacement costs of an individual is something like, 
in excess of, a full year’s salary.  [HR1] 
The costs of employee turnaround... really substantial.  ...so 
measuring what the level of turnover is in our organisation and 
getting insights into perhaps what are our areas with the highest 
turnover, what are our areas with the lowest turnover... this enables 
us to then understand what’s going on.  We’ve done calculations and 
even something like a 1% reduction in turnover leads to a multi-
million pound impact on the business, so it’s really substantial for 
an organisation of this size.  [HR1] 
However, it was recognised that a certain level of turnover was 
healthy and a valuable contribution in terms of new skills and ideas 
entering the company.  It, therefore, appears somewhat of a balance 
between costs involved in reappointing and fresh insight:  
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So at a high level absolutely we want to retain our employees and 
we don’t want to have too much turnover, but at the same time 
zero turnover is not necessarily something that we would aspire 
to.  [HR1]
Understanding how the various human capital components 
contribute to company value did appear to be a focus for the human 
resources specialists participating in this study.  As one questionnaire 
respondent put it:
Measuring the correlation between human capital and its 
contribution to added value is the holy grail! Until this is clear 
(and in what way) it cannot inform our human capital disclosure 
policies and practices.  [Questionnaire respondent]
The impact of human capital on corporate performance was further 
emphasised during the interviews: 
Human capital is all about obtaining insights and using 
measurements as a way of gaining deeper insights into what drives 
effective performance and in turn impacts business results.  [HR1]
Internal use and external disclosure of human capital 
components 
RQ2: What are the levels of internal management use and external disclosure 
for specific human capital components?
Questionnaire respondents were asked whether information relating 
to the various components of human capital was used internally by 
management and whether they were disclosed externally to various 
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stakeholders.  The percentage of respondents who responded in the 
affirmative is shown in Table 5.2, columns two and three, which is 
ordered in descending order of internal management use.  The final 
column in this table calculates the ratio of external disclosure to internal 
management use for the sample as a whole.  
Table 5.2  The views of human resources directors on internal use and 
external disclosure of human capital components (n=67)
Are the following human capital 
components used internally by 
management and/or disclosed externally 













Employee training and development 87 25 29
Workplace safety 85 59 69
Employee remuneration procedures 85 32 38
Employee turnover 82 37 45
Recruitment and selection procedures 82 18 22
Employee satisfaction 73 23 32
Employee skills and education 70 22 31
Quality of relations with company 
employees 64 18 28
Employee attitude 64 15 23
Employee motivation 59 11 19
Employee equality 58 21 36
Employee experience 58 18 31
Employee behaviour 58 8 14
Employee welfare 56 11 20
Employee commitment 56 12 21
Employee entrepreneurial skills 45 5 11
Employee adaptability 43 5 12
Employee reputation 39 15 38
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‘Employee training and development’ is the human capital 
component which is most widely used internally by company 
management, with 87% of questionnaire respondents doing so. 
However, only 29% of these respondents indicated that this information 
is also disclosed externally.  This is somewhat surprising as companies 
might be expected to promote their training and development to 
attract high calibre prospective employees.  A potential explanation was 
offered by one of the interviewees.  It was suggested that the diversity 
and mixture of training and development led to “those kind of generic 
types of statements” [HR1] made externally with specific and relevant 
information communicated internally:
When we are recruiting for particular roles there will clearly be a 
different kind of learning provision for those types of roles versus 
a different type of role.  That’s the kind of information that we 
probably would include in the induction, when an employee joins 
the organisation.  [HR1]
‘Workplace safety’ information is also used internally by a large 
number of respondents, with 85% indicating this to be the case.  Of 
the companies who use workplace safety information internally, 69% 
also disclose externally, which is the highest ratio of external to internal 
disclosure.  The high level of internal use probably reflects the legal 
requirement under the UK Health and Safety Executive to develop 
policies, undertake risk assessments and provide employees with relevant 
information.  The high level of external disclosure could to some extent 
reflect the mandatory requirement to report (although not necessarily 
publicly in the corporate annual report) certain workplace incidents 
under the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences 
Regulations 1995 (RIDDOR).  The importance of information on 
workplace safety was further highlighted in the interviews:
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Highly important! We have a number of key performance indicators 
that are reviewed as part of corporate governance and health and 
safety is one of those.  There is a monthly report to the PLC board 
as to how our statistics are running.  It is an active agenda item.  
[HR2]    
Employee equality, although a middle ranking component in 
terms of internal use and external disclosure, is disclosed externally by 
a significant proportion of those who report internally.  In a study of 
annual report disclosures of equal opportunities for women, Grosser et 
al. (2008) find that most reporting covers women’s employment patterns 
and is more limited in relation to recruitment, development, and career 
development and training.
Information relating to ‘employee remuneration procedures’, 
‘employee turnover’, and ‘recruitment and selection procedures’ were 
also widely used internally (by more than 80%).  The link between these 
components and the impact on company costs appears to be clearer than 
for some of the other human capital components.
Clearly you have to make sure that you recruit the right person 
into the job and if you don’t you have high turnover and it’s 
expensive.  [HR1] 
The clear linkage perhaps explains why employee remuneration 
procedures and employee turnover are frequently also disclosed externally. 
It was, however, apparent from the interviews that companies are 
attempting to capture information on the less tangible human capital 
components such as employee satisfaction, motivation and commitment. 
Methods of doing so included employee opinion surveys, appraisal 
reviews and manager observation.  
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We have a metric called employee engagement index which 
measures how committed an employee is to the organisation, 
whether they’re striving, putting in the discretionary effort to stay 
with the organisation.  [HR1]
Everybody has a performance development and review every 
year.  A review of commitments, development, and value.  It is a 
combination of two things.  How has someone performed against 
commitment and what will help the employee realise more worth 
and value in their job.  [HR2]
However, from questionnaire and interview responses it was 
apparent that, whilst companies recognise the potential value of using 
human capital information, they are sometimes frustrated by an inability 
to adequately capture the information that they felt they needed.
I will be doing it [looking at the skills and education of the 
workforce] when I have a HR system to capture it.  [HR2]    
The structure of our company means that, unlike financial 
reporting, human capital information is not centralised.  This 
makes it impossible to meaningfully report group-wide human 
capital information.  [Questionnaire respondent]
Other constraints were also felt:
There is a balance you must strike between measuring and doing.  
If you spend all your time measuring are you focusing enough 
on the doing? Also, in a cash restrained environment a company 
sometimes must be careful about too many surveys of employee 
satisfaction/motivation etc.  Because in asking the question you 
create expectations that things will change and sometimes you 
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know what you need to do but can’t afford it.  [Questionnaire 
respondent]
The external disclosure of the vast majority of human capital 
components appears very low.  The following section investigates the 
incentives and disincentives impacting upon voluntary disclosure.
Incentives and disincentives in relation to human 
capital disclosure
RQ3a: What is the relative importance of the various incentives and 
disincentives in relation to the [human capital] external disclosure decision? 
Respondents were asked their views in relation to the relative 
importance of various incentives in relation to the disclosure of human 
capital information.  Aggregate responses are shown in Table 5.3 in 
descending rank order where: 1= not important at all; 2 = of little 
importance; 3 = fairly important; 4 = important; and 5 = very important. 
The average score for all incentives to voluntarily disclose human capital 
information was significantly different from one  i.e. not important at 
all, suggesting that all of the reasons investigated provide an incentive 
to some degree.
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Table 5.3  The views of human resources directors on incentives to 
voluntarily disclose human capital information externally 
(n=67)
How important are the following 
incentives in relation to your 
company’s voluntary disclosure of 




score Consensus21 2 3 4 5
Helping to attract new employees of 
high calibre  0 3 12 41 39 4.22 High
Helping to retain employees of high 
calibre  2 5 10 41 37 4.14 Medium
Demonstrating our company is socially 
responsible 3 3 16 40 31 3.98 Medium
Promoting a reputation for transparent/
accurate reporting 2 5 23 38 26 3.88 Medium
Providing important information 
to investors that is not included in 
mandatory financial disclosures
2 8 20 36 28 3.86 Medium
Helping to create trustworthiness with 
other stakeholders 5 3 23 40 21 3.75 Medium
Keeping up with comparable companies 
operating in our industry 5 7 16 44 20 3.73 Medium
Demonstrating good employee relations 3 10 20 37 23 3.71 Medium
Helping to create trustworthiness with 
employees 5 7 25 34 23 3.68 Medium
As a motivation for employees 7 13 23 30 20 3.46 Low
Revealing to outsiders the skill level of 
our managers 7 13 23 28 15 3.37 Low
Increasing the predictability of our  
future prospects 10 8 27 25 10 3.21 Low
Helping to promote good relations with 
government agencies 10 15 29 26 10 3.13 Low
Notes
1. Response categories are: 1=not important at all, 2=of little importance, 3=fairly 
important, 4=important, 5=very important.  
2. Standard deviation of less than or equal to 0.85 =high consensus; standard 
deviation of greater than 0.85 and less than or equal to 1.10 = medium consensus; 
standard deviation of greater than 1.10 = low consensus.
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The most important incentives to disclose human capital 
information externally are perceived as ‘attracting and retaining 
employees of high calibre’ (average scores of 4.22 and 4.14, respectively). 
To obtain employees of high calibre there clearly has to be an exchange 
of information, achieved, at least partially, through external disclosure. 
As one interviewee put it:
One of our biggest challenges is to get the balance of recruiting 
people who look like us, and recruiting people who are slightly 
outside that mould that they could bring their creativity.  Clearly 
you can’t mix oil and water and by recruiting people that notionally 
look like us, it’s been a very effective model.  [HR2]
Approximately 71% of respondents viewed ‘demonstrating social 
responsibility’ to be an important or very important incentive (average 
score 3.98).  According to one interviewee, social responsibility is 
important at different levels:
At a divisional level or site level, we are a major employer in the 
communities of which we reside.  So there are community programs 
from the social through to the environmental.  We have fireworks 
and summer garden parties.  We work with the local health and 
safety inspectorate and town councils.  We look to see how we can 
minimise our utilities use and look to the environmental impact.  
At a corporate level, we actually look to develop training with our 
directors on corporate social responsibility so that there is a conscious 
awareness of the impact of doing business in the community at 
large.  [HR2]
Approximately 61% of respondents indicated that ‘creating 
trustworthiness with other stakeholders’ was an important or very 
important incentive (average score 3.75).  However, one of the 
interviewees noted that communication was one of the reasons that less 
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trust was placed in the executives of the company.  The implication was 
that external disclosure or using ‘city speak’ internally was not sufficient:
We need to re-interpret the business speak into something that 
people can personally identify with.  [HR2]
If people can find more personal identity in the message that is 
being given out, then they can align themselves more to it because it 
feeds from what is in them, and therefore they are more productive 
and therefore we get the output.  [HR2]
These findings resonate with the findings of McInnes et al. (2007) in 
relation to the benefits of personalising communications with employees, 
by using employee road shows.
The least important incentives for disclosing human capital 
information externally relates to ‘promoting good relationships 
with government agencies’ (average score 3.13) and ‘increasing the 
predictability of future prospects’ (average score 3.21).  However, 
consensus of opinion was low in relation to these incentives.  Consensus 
in relation to the importance of ‘motivating employees’ (average score 
3.46) and ‘revealing to outsiders the skill level of managers’ (average 
score 3.37) through external disclosure was also low.  These four average 
scores were all significantly lower than all other scores.  In one interview 
the motivation of employees was suggested as being achieved through 
both internal and external communication.  
They are motivated by that [the company singing their praises 
to external people] because that is a pride and a recognition, 
and recognition can be worth more than monetary reward.  We 
promote that internally.  So if somebody or a team have done a 
particularly good project, then they get a CEO award and there 
are all sorts of recognition programs across the company  which 
goes into the newsletters.  [HR2] 
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The degree of importance attached to revealing to outsiders the skill level 
of managers may reflect the perceived risk of doing so: 
We report in our annual report and accounts carefully, because if you have 
got good people then other people want them.  A bit of a catch twenty 
two.  [HR1]
Due to the niche nature of our industry, we are sometimes vulnerable to 
head hunters, especially in sales.  [Questionnaire respondent]
Questionnaire respondents were asked their views in relation to the relative 
importance of certain disincentives to disclose human capital information. 
Aggregate responses are shown in Table 5.4.
Table 5.4  The views of human resources directors on disincentives to 
voluntarily disclosing human capital information externally 
(n=67)
How important are the following 
disincentives in relation to your 
company’s voluntary disclosure of 
human capital information externally?
Response category1
percentage of respondents Average 
score Consensus21 2 3 4 5
Avoiding giving away information 
which may harm our competitive 
position
7 12 19 17 41 3.77 1.32
Reducing the costs of collecting and 
disseminating information 7 17 24 29 14 3.28 1.17
Avoiding attracting unwanted scrutiny 
by other stakeholders 9 32 27 14 10 2.83 1.15
Avoiding attracting unwanted scrutiny 
by regulators 14 34 17 12 15 2.80 1.32
Notes
1. Response categories are: 1=not important at all, 2=of little importance, 3=fairly important, 
4=important, 5=very important.  
2. Standard deviation of less than or equal to 0.85 =high consensus; standard deviation of greater 
than 0.85 and less than or equal to 1.10 = medium consensus; standard deviation of greater 
than 1.10 = low consensus.
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The most important disincentive was ‘avoiding giving away 
information which might harm competitive position’ scoring an 
average of 3.77, significantly higher than the next highest ranking item. 
Approximately 58% of respondents viewed this as important or very 
important.  As one interviewee put it:
We do get quite a feed from people and some of our employees 
have gone to competitors and some of their people have come to 
us.  [HR2]
We have a strong reputation externally and we place a very high 
value on our human capital team and our human capital strategy, 
that’s a competitive advantage for us.  So we would be cautious 
to some degree in the level of information, the level of detail we 
would share with our competitors externally.  [HR1]  
However, the competitive advantage side to disclosing human 
capital was also evident:
I look at FTSE 250... best practice if you can find it.  Some of the 
big boys and some of the big consultancies spend multi-millions 
on what best practice is.  So I can look at that, cream off the most 
valuable twenty per cent for us and will fit it into what we do.  
[HR2]
However, the desired information is not always obtained/available 
via ‘free’ disclosure from comparable companies.  One interviewee 
mentioned the purchase of human capital information and reliance on 
academic research:
I buy empirical evidence.  We get the empirical information from 
think tanks and I work a lot with academia.  [HR2]
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‘Reducing the costs of disclosure’ (average score 3.28) ranked 
second, significantly above the next highest ranking item.  Avoiding 
attracting unwanted scrutiny by other stakeholders (average score 2.83) 
and by regulators (average score 2.80) also acted as disincentives to 
voluntary disclosure to some degree.  Other disincentives mentioned 
by questionnaire respondents and interviewees included internal data 
capture, comparability and the relevance of disclosing human capital 
information:
Quality of systems and accuracy of information [are a disincentive].  
[Questionnaire respondent]
Ability to measure in such a way as to compare like with like with 
other companies.  [Questionnaire respondent]
Business complexity and diversity make comparisons difficult.  
[Questionnaire respondent]
Take employee engagement, we cannot compare our employee 
engagement because the mathematical modelling behind it is 
different.  They [the company] always want to benchmark and 
I sort of said no.  Stop looking externally to self validate, it is 
tougher than that, you have actually got to make your own business 
decisions yourself.  Where people want statistics or information, it 
can lead you to a real rabbit hole.  [HR2] 
However, the latter view appears far from universal when 
the following interviewee clearly emphasised the importance of 
benchmarking the company against comparators:
We participate in the Sunday Times Best Place to Work Survey 
and we’ve scored really well.  We’ve certainly been in the kind of 
top ten employers.  [HR1] 
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We don’t just look at navel gazing at our own results, we want 
to know how we compare to other organisations.  We benchmark 
all of our employee opinion survey results against the global high 
performing norms.  [HR1] 
Communication channels and human capital 
information 
RQ4a: How effective are the various forms of communication in relation to 
the disclosure of [human capital]?
Respondents were asked their views in relation to the effectiveness of 
various forms of written communication in relation to disclosing human 
capital information.  Aggregate responses are shown in Table 5.5, where: 
1= effective; 2 = neutral; 3 = ineffective.  The number of respondents 
indicating ‘don’t know’ (DK) or ‘not applicable’ (N/A) were significant 
and are thus included in Table 5.5.  The consensus of responses (extent 
of agreement among respondents) is categorised as high, medium or 
low based on the standard deviation of responses.  The final column 
indicates whether the communication channel is viewed as effective or 
ineffective, based on whether the average score is statistically significantly 
different from neutral.
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Table 5.5  The views of human resources directors on human capital 
disclosure and forms of written communication (n=67)
Rate the following 
channels of corporate 
communication for your 
company’s disclosure 









response3 1 2 3 DK N/A
Annual corporate report        73 11 9 6 1 1.31 High Effective
Annual review 35 24 5 15 21 1.53 High Effective
Corporate social 
responsibility report                 38 26 6 8 22 1.54 Medium Effective
Press releases 44 28 11 6 11 1.59 Medium Effective
Company web pages 46 34 12 6 2 1.63 Medium Effective
Company newsletters 
(external) 30 13 11 11 35 1.65 Low Effective
Notes
1. Response categories are: 1=effective, 2=neutral, 3=ineffective, DK=don’t know, 
N/A=Not applicable.
2. Standard deviation of less than or equal to 0.65 = high consensus; standard deviation 
of greater than 0.65 and less than or equal to 0.75 = medium consensus; standard 
deviation of greater than 0.75 = low consensus.
3. Based on statistical test to identify if average scores are significantly different from 
2-neutral.
The ‘annual corporate report’ was considered the most effective 
written communication for disclosing human capital externally, with 
approximately 73% of respondents viewing it as effective.  It should be 
noted, however, that respondents were not asked about as large a range 
of channels as finance directors.  The annual report rated slightly higher 
than the next highest ranking channel (the annual review).
To the shareholders, it [the annual report] is their window on the 
organisation.  Current shareholders and prospective shareholders 
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and also the directors and of course analysts... would naturally 
turn to the annual report.  [HR2] 
The annual report will go out to our shareholders and it’s important 
that the shareholders are aware of the key aspects of what we’re 
doing within the organisation on HR and the human capital 
strategy.  [HR1]
It was evident that the human resources function contributes to the 
production of the corporate annual report:
I write the remuneration section, the corporate governance section.  
I write the drafts for the CEO on the people section and then as 
with the rest of the executive committee, I read it to make sure 
that the whole thing broadly fits together and we don’t cut across 
each other.  [HR2]
Approximately 38% of questionnaire respondents indicated that the 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) report was an effective channel for 
communicating human capital information (average score 1.54).  This 
relatively low level is perhaps surprising, given the obvious link between 
employees and companies responsibilities in respect of them.  However, 
CSR reports are not universally produced – 22% of respondents indicated 
that it did not apply to them and a further 8% responded don’t know. 
Numerous human resources metrics appear to be externally disclosed 
in the CSR report:
We externally report our human capital strategy and metrics 
through our corporate responsibility report. [Questionnaire 
respondent]
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We do have a corporate social responsibility report and within that 
there are elements of different HR components and that includes 
information about the human capital team.  [HR1]  
Approximately 46% of questionnaire respondents indicated that 
‘company web pages’ were effective for external communication (average 
score 1.63) with only 8% indicating not applicable or don’t know.  One 
interviewee noted that communication channels require continuing 
attention as a consequence of dynamic and changing technologies:
We are refreshing our website because it was a little bit old and 
we have just worked with Sky Television to take part in a careers 
program that will be sent out on whatever satellite programs, and 
it will be streamed into Facebook and Bebo.  So we are getting 
more creative at how we might be able to reach our potential 
employees.  [HR2]
Interviewees further emphasised the importance of the web 
internally, consistent with the positive views regarding the intranet 
documented by McInnes et al. (2007, p.91):
We have an intranet which is available to the vast majority of 
employees around the world.  [HR1]
Indeed, the importance of communication to human resources 
appeared to somewhat take precedence over the external communication 
about human resources.  Several respondents mentioned private business 
TV channels for employees:
We have several strands to our internal communication approach 
and one of those is TV.  Our Chief Executive is interviewed on 
a frequent basis and has town hall meetings with employees and 
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these are recorded and replayed to lots of different office locations, so 
that employees around the world can first hand kind of experience 
that.  [HR1] 
‘External company newsletters’ appear to be the least effective 
channel for communicating human capital information (average score 
1.65).  Approximately 30% of questionnaire respondents indicated 
the question was not applicable as they did not produce company 
newsletters, and only approximately 30% indicated newsletters were 
effective.  Interviewees appeared to suggest that newsletters were better 
designed for internal communication:
They [company newsletters] are written in terms that are much 
more appropriate for the internal [audience].  [HR2] 
However, it was suggested that newsletters were more effective 
externally if they were specially targeted:
What we do have is a media brochure on some of the jazzy fun 
stuff that we are doing and the thought-leading stuff that we are 
doing that comes out quarterly and that is very useful at trade 
shows and to third parties.  It is a way of making us accessible to 
them.  [HR2] 
Summary: human resources directors’ views
The evidence presented in this chapter supports the following main 
conclusions regarding human resources director’s views: 
•	 RQ1: Human capital components – all of the human capital 
components investigated contribute to company value to some 
degree.  ‘Employee skills and education’; ‘employee commitment’; 
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‘positive employee attitudes’; ‘positive employee behaviour’; and 
‘employee motivation’  were ranked the top five components in 
terms of their contribution.  Bringing employee skills together, 
rather than skilled individuals operating in isolation, is important. 
The interaction between individual human capital components 
such as skills, attitude and behaviour is important in the value 
creation process.  Individual human capital components can 
impact the other IC categories of structural and relational capital. 
Human resources directors do appear to focus on how the various 
human capital components contribute to company value.       
•	 RQ2: Internal use and external disclosure of human capital – 
‘employee training and development’; ‘workplace safety’; ‘employee 
remuneration procedures’; ‘employee turnover’; ‘recruitment 
and selection procedures’; and ‘employee satisfaction’ were the 
top five components used internally by company management. 
Companies are attempting to capture information on the less 
tangible human capital components through opinion surveys, 
appraisal reviews and manager observation.  External disclosure 
of the vast majority of human capital components is low.   
•	 RQ3a: Incentives to voluntarily disclose human capital – all of 
the reasons investigated provide an incentive to the voluntarily 
disclosure of human capital information to some degree.  ‘Helping 
to attract new employees of high calibre’ and ‘helping to retain 
employees of high calibre’ were the most important incentives.
•	 RQ3a: Disincentives to voluntarily disclose human capital – all of 
the reasons investigated provide a disincentive to the voluntarily 
disclosure of human capital information to some degree.  ‘Avoiding 
giving away “company secrets” or otherwise harming competitive 
position’ was more important than all other disincentives. 
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Additional disincentives mentioned included internal data capture, 
comparability, and relevance.
•	 RQ4a: Communication channels – all of the written communication 
channels investigated were considered effective for the external 
disclosure of human capital information.  The corporate annual 
report was the most effective.  The human resources function 
contributes to the annual report production.  The CSR report 
was not produced by a number of companies.  The importance of 
communication to employees takes precedence over the external 
communication about human resources via private business TV 
channels or internal newsletters.  
6results: QuestionnAire responses And interviews with mArketing directors
Introduction
Individual marketing and customer relations components and their 
disclosure were further investigated by obtaining views and opinions from 
the marketing/commercial functional specialists across UK corporations. 
Relational capital is one of the major categories of IC (Lev and Zambon, 
2003).  Relational capital is defined as all resources linked to the external 
relationships of the firm, with customers, suppliers and R&D partners. 
According to the American Marketing Association (2007), marketing is 
defined by as the activity, set of institutions, and processes for creating, 
communicating, delivering, and exchanging offerings that have value for 
customers, clients, partners, and society at large.  Relational capital thus 
appears to be a broad concept which captures a company’s marketing 
function.  Obtaining views and opinions from marketing directors can 
be further justified on the basis of the proposition that IC reporting can 
be used as a valuable marketing tool (van der Meer-Kooistra and Zijlstra, 
2001).  A recent survey by the Intellectual Assets Centre also found that 
Scottish-based companies are increasingly exploiting their intellectual 
assets with marketing materials (Russell, 2007).  
The findings from questionnaire responses and follow up interviews 
are presented in this chapter.  The next section considers the extent 
to which various marketing and customer relations components are 
considered to contribute to company value.  The third section reports the 
extent to which various marketing and customer relations components 
are used internally by management and disclosed externally.  The 
importance of various incentives and disincentives to the voluntary 
disclosure of marketing and customer relations information externally 
106 intellectual capital reporting: academic utopia or corporate reality in a Brave new world?
is considered in the fourth section.  The fifth section considers the 
effectiveness of alternative channels of corporate communication for 
disclosing marketing and customer relations information externally.  A 
summary of marketing directors’ views is presented in the final section.
Marketing and customer relations contribution to 
corporate value
RQ1: What is the view of [marketing directors]regarding the relative 
importance of [eighteen marketing/customer relations components] in 
the generation of company value?
Questionnaire respondents were asked their views in relation to 
the relative contribution of eighteen marketing/customer relations 
components to creating value for their companies.
Aggregate responses are shown in Table 6.1, in descending rank 
order, where: 1 = no contribution; 2 = weak contribution; 3 = moderate 
contribution; 4 = strong contribution; and 5 = very strong contribution. 
Percentages may not total 100% as the ‘don’t know’ category is not 
shown.  The average score is shown in the second last column and the 
consensus or extent of agreement among respondents is categorised as 
high, medium or low, based on the standard deviation of responses.
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Table 6.1 The views of marketing directors regarding the relative 
importance of marketing/customer relations components to 
generating company value (n=68)
To what extent do the following 
marketing/customer relations 
components contribute to creating 
value for your company?
Response category1
percentage of respondents Average 
score Consensus21 2 3 4 5
Customer relationships 1 0 9 30 60 4.46 High
Company reputation 1 3 9 28 58 4.39 Medium
Competitive edge in terms of quality 
of product/service 2 2 6 53 58 4.25 High
Data/knowledge of customers 1 1 19 27 51 4.24 Medium
Customer loyalty 4 6 18 37 34 3.91 Medium
Company image 4 4 18 43 30 3.90 Medium
Development of products/ideas 4 6 15 54 19 3.79 Medium
Product portfolio 4 7 16 49 21 3.76 Medium
Competitive edge in terms of cost of 
product/service 4 4 36 33 22 3.64 Medium
Marketing strategies 3 6 34 37 19 3.64 Medium
Brand names 3 13 28 33 22 3.58 Medium
After sales service 11 11 21 32 26 3.52 Low
Distribution channels 6 15 25 31 20 3.44 Low
Competitive edge in terms of 
adaptability of business practices 1 18 37 27 16 3.39 Medium
Market share 9 7 36 31 13 3.34 Low
Competitive edge in terms of the 
timing of product/service release 6 13 37 34 9 3.27 Medium
Relationships with the government 21 30 18 15 15 2.73 Low
Relationship with the public 21 27 25 22 4 2.63 Low
Notes
1. Response categories are: 1=no contribution, 2=weak contribution, 3=moderate 
contribution, 4=strong contribution, 5=very strong contribution.  
2. Standard deviation of less than or equal to 0.85 =high consensus; standard deviation 
of greater than 0.85 and less than or equal to 1.10 = medium consensus; standard 
deviation of greater than 1.10 = low consensus.
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The average score for all marketing/customer relations components 
was significantly different from one, i.e. no contribution at all.  This 
suggests that all of the components investigated contribute to company 
value to some degree.  ‘Customer relationships’, with an average score 
of 4.46, contribute to company value the most – approximately 90% 
of respondents indicated it made a strong or very strong contribution. 
‘Company reputation’ (average score 4.39), ‘competitive edge in terms 
of quality of product/service’ (average score 4.25), and ‘data/knowledge 
of customers’ (average score 4.24) also appear to contribute to company 
value to a great extent.  These four components scored significantly 
higher than the next highest ranking component.
There is a low level of consensus in relation to the contribution 
provided by three mid-to-low ranking components: ‘after sales service’ 
(average score 3.52); ‘distribution channels’ (average score 3.44); and 
‘market share’ (average score 3.34).  ‘Relationships with the government’ 
(average score 2.73) and ‘relationships with the public’ (average score 
2.63) contributed the least to company value with 51% and 48% of 
respondents respectively indicating they provided no or only weak 
contribution.  Both of these components scored significantly lower than 
the next lowest ranking component.  However, there was a low consensus 
of opinion in relation to these two components also.  
Returning to the high ranking items, the contribution of customer 
relationships featured prominently in the interviews: 
The customer relationship for us starts from the first introduction 
on the telephone, having seen an advert from us and then obviously 
goes right the way through to the after sales care, which is after 
they’ve actually transacted some business with us.  We will then 
phone them and say how are you doing? [MD1] 
Trust on the part of customers appears to play a significant part 
in their relationships with the company which appears to be reflected 
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in corporate reputation.  Reputation appeared central to the minds of 
several interviewees: 
  
In terms of reputation, this really comes back down to trust.  
Longevity is a good core for being trusted.  [MD1]
It [reputation] is absolutely fundamental.  The reason people 
will buy from us is because they don’t have as many people who 
understand as well as we do, so they have to trust us.  When they 
are trusting us with a multi-million dollar engagement, then that 
trust needs to be built on something.  So our reputation has to 
come from being recognised by our peers in the industry as knowing 
what we are doing.  [MD3]
Massive! Hard won, easily lost.  Service failure is a thing that keeps 
us all operating in the business awake at nights.  Reputation moving 
forward is increasingly important to us.  We would like to think 
that if people are thinking about good quality value-for-money 
they’d think of [company name].  [MD2]
The contribution of ‘competitive edge in terms of the quality of 
the product/service’ to company value also featured strongly in the 
interviews:
The quality aspect is fundamental to the ethos of our company.  
If you want to take an example, if you phone up [competitor 
company] and you want to get support and you actually want to 
talk to a human which is hard, but assuming you manage it, the 
first question you will be asked is, what is your support arrangement 
and are you up to date and if you’re not they won’t talk to you.  
We’ve always taken the opposite ethos that says if the customer 
phones up, at least we think they are a customer, we actually won’t 
check particularly hard, we’ll answer the question, we’ll help them 
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through their problem and the following day we’ll work out should 
they be paying for this, but you fix the customer first.  [MD4]
In the eyes of questionnaire respondents, the contribution of 
competitive edge in terms of quality appears to contribute more to 
company value than the contribution of competitive edge in terms of 
cost (average scores 4.25 and 3.64, respectively).  
One interviewee appeared to suggest that competitive edge in terms 
of quality and cost were somewhat of a trade-off:
I don’t think anybody deliberately sets out to buy the worst-quality 
service.  I think what most people try to do is to buy the best value 
for money they can afford.  [MD2]
Approximately 78% of questionnaire respondents viewed ‘data/
knowledge of customers’ as providing a strong or very strong contribution 
to company value.  In the interviews the importance of this information 
to generating repeat business was emphasised: 
Knowledge of customers is critical to understand how our customers 
sell their products to their customers and how they market them.  So 
the more you understand about how customers use our technology as 
part of their overall marketing message, the better we can actually 
promote our next technologies to them.  [MD3] 
If you don’t know who your customers are, which of your products 
they have, what they’re doing with them and to a large extent, 
why they care about them, it’s incredibly difficult to go back and 
sell them anything else.  [MD4] 
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However it was recognised that possession of ‘data/knowledge of 
customers’ was not enough in itself.  It was necessary to identify what 
was important in a specific context and able to be used to create value:
The interpretation piece is absolutely crucial because interesting 
data to one person maybe completely irrelevant to someone else.  
One man’s information is another man’s tittle-tattle.  [MD2] 
The contribution of ‘after-sales service’ to company value appears 
to be very much situation-specific.  This supports the evidence of a 
lack of consensus among questionnaire respondents in relation to this 
particular component:
It’s [after sales service] an interesting area where we find a huge 
variation on how our customers work with us.  Some customers we 
will occasionally hear from.  We have big maintenance contracts 
as part of our engagement and how we deliver on that after sales 
service is fundamental.  There are some customers that will use that 
quite sparingly, because they choose to do their own thing.  There 
are other customers who’ll absolutely hammer that service.  [MD3]
If they [customers] can say we know [company name] is really 
good at delivering after sales support, they’re really good, they’re 
responsive, they’re well qualified and they help us a lot, then that 
is a very important tick in the box for the next buying decision, 
so it adds a lot of value.  [MD3]  
Approximately 51% and 48% of questionnaire respondents viewed 
‘relationships with the government’ and ‘relationships with the public’ as 
providing no or only weak contribution to company value respectively. 
However, in the interviews these components appeared to feature 
indirectly in specific contexts.  For example, a particular government 
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department was a major customer for one interviewee.  Further, several 
interviewees alluded to creating a reputation as ‘a company the public 
could trust’ with a view to attracting potential customers and retaining 
existing ones.  This serves to illustrate the difficulty involved in separately 
identifying mutually exclusive IC components.  It was apparent that 
several of the components mentioned were interrelated.  
Internal use and external disclosure of marketing/
customer relations components 
RQ2: What are the levels of internal management use and external disclosure 
for specific relational capital components?
Questionnaire respondents were asked whether information relating 
to the various marketing/customer relations components was used 
internally by management and whether they were disclosed externally 
to various stakeholders.  The percentage of respondents who responded 
in the affirmative is shown in Table 6.2, columns two and three, which 
is ordered in descending order of internal management use.  The final 
column in this table calculates the ratio of external disclosures to internal 
management use for the sample as a whole.  
113reSultS: QueStionnaire reSponSeS and interviewS with marketing directorS
Table 6.2 The views of marketing directors on internal use and 
external disclosure of marketing/customer relations 
components (n=68)
Are the following marketing/customer 
relations components used internally 
by management and/or disclosed 













Data/knowledge of customers 85 7 8
Marketing strategies 81 15 19
Customer relationships 79 16 20
Competitive edge in terms of cost of 
product/service 72 16 22
Market share 71 38 54
Competitive edge in terms of quality of 
product/service 71 32 45
Customer loyalty 71 12 17
Company reputation 68 43 63
Development of products/ideas 68 18 26
Product portfolio 66 44 67
Company image 66 32 48
After sales service 63 28 44
Distribution channels 62 21 34
Competitive edge in terms of adaptability 
of business practices 56 12 21
Brand names 53 46 87
Competitive edge in terms of the timing 
of product/service release 46 18 39
Relationships with the government 38 10 26
Relationships with the public 34 22 65
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‘Data/knowledge of customers’ is the marketing/customer 
relations component which is most widely used internally by company 
management, with 85% of questionnaire respondents doing so.  From 
the interviews it became clear that companies struggled with methods 
of obtaining and coordinating information about their customers:
We have many contact points with the customer.  All of them touch 
the customer in different places in different ways, coordinating that 
information flow is vitally important.  Most organisations do a 
pretty poor job at it.  It’s hard, it’s difficult to do.  [MD4]
If you don’t know who you are selling to you can’t sell to them.  So 
we spend a lot of time, a lot of effort, on maintaining databases 
of individuals, of organisations.  [MD2]
The more valuable information is gathered ad hoc.  Historically, 
we had a system which is very much based around a very restricted 
formal view of the customer.  The new system is fairly simple to do 
simple things.  They [company employees] can log something as 
simple as I had a phone call with Fred and he gave me this snippet 
and it’s recorded against the customer.  [MD4] 
We have a relatively sophisticated customer-relationship 
management system which we use, and that will take individual-
level data.  [MD2]
Various methods of collecting customer information were mentioned 
during the interviews:
Within the customer services department, we collate how many 
calls or contacts, a lot of them web based these days, on particular 
products, on particular regions, on particular time frames.  [MD4]
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We have introduced an annual customer survey because we can 
now use the web to do that quickly and easily.  [MD4]
Only 8% of those using the information internally indicated that 
‘data/knowledge of customers’ was also externally disclosed.  However, 
the low level of external disclosure is hardly surprising given that the 
detail of such information provides the potential for customer poaching 
from competitors.  Information in relation to ‘customer relationships’ 
was used internally by 79% of questionnaire respondents (ranking 
third).  However, only 20% of those disclosed externally.  From the 
interviews, it was apparent that while companies might obtain benefit in 
terms of their reputation from public disclosure of who their customers 
are, the relationship with that customer may be adversely affected as a 
consequence:
One of the things we’re communicating internally is what is 
sensitive and what is not.  Externally what we always try and do 
is communicate whatever we can about not only our customers 
and the relationships we have with them, but also our customer’s 
customers.  [MD3]  
Approximately 72% and 71% of questionnaire respondents 
indicated that they internally used information in relation to ‘competitive 
edge in terms of cost of product/service’ and ‘competitive edge in terms 
of quality of product/service’, respectively (ranking fourth and sixth). 
Of these respondents, 45% disclosed the information about quality 
externally, whereas only 22% externally disclosed information about cost. 
Alternative methods for obtaining information in relation to competitive 
position were highlighted in the interviews.
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Customers are incredibly willing to offer information about 
competitors’ products.  So most of it comes from informal feedback 
from a customer.  We do subscribe to a number of industry analyst 
organisations and use them for their external views.  [MD4]
We do what I say is mystery shopping... we do phone the 
competition; look at their response rate.  I would take the marketing 
directors out to lunch and we’ll share ideas.  [MD1] 
We do provide research, 350 telephone based interviews... and 
we get a matrix out of those.  We also subscribe to two pieces of 
syndicated research.  [MD1] 
From Table 6.2 it is evident that information in relation to the 
majority of marketing/customer relations components is not widely 
disclosed externally.  However, one interviewee also highlighted 
restrictions placed on the disclosure of information internally, and a 
culture to safeguard information in the hands of top management: 
There’s a whole series of matrices internally... Of the 60 internal 
matrices, we’re only willing to show internally seven of them.  
Even internally, we suffer from don’t want to put it up there in 
lights, in case it doesn’t look very good, so let’s just stick with the 
basics.  [MD1]
Interestingly, four components that were middle-ranking in terms of 
internal management use were the highest ranking in terms of external 
disclosure: ‘brand names’; ‘product portfolio’; ‘company reputation’; and 
‘market share’.  Davison and Skerratt (2006) find that brand names and 
products are frequently disclosed in the annual report and annual review, 
using pictures as well as text.  One interviewee stressed the importance 
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of images in the external disclosure of marketing/customer relations 
information: 
The reason for putting as many pictures in is to try and bring 
the company to life, and it’s what I call emotionalise the brand.  
[MD1]
Incentives and disincentives in relation to marketing/
customer relations disclosure
RQ3a: What is the relative importance of the various incentives and 
disincentives in relation to the [relational] IC external disclosure decision? 
Respondents were asked their views in relation to the relative 
importance of various incentives in relation to the disclosure of 
marketing/customer relations information.  Aggregate responses are 
shown in Table 6.3 in descending rank order where: 1= not important 
at all; 2 = of little importance; 3 = fairly important; 4 = important; and 
5 = very important.  The average score for all incentives to voluntarily 
disclose was significantly different from one, i.e. not important at all, 
suggesting that all of the reasons investigated provide an incentive to 
some degree.
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Table 6.3 The views of marketing directors on incentives to 
voluntarily disclose marketing/customer relations 
information externally (n=68)
How important are the following 
incentives in relation to your company’s 
voluntary disclosure of marketing/




score Consensus21 2 3 4 5
Helping to create trustworthiness with 
customers 6 8 11 36 36 3.90 Low
Helping to create trustworthiness with other 
stakeholders 3 8 25 36 23 3.72 Medium
Helping to retain customers 6 13 16 35 27 3.65 Low
Helping to attract new customers 10 10 16 37 27 3.63 Low
Providing important information to 
investors that is not included in mandatory 
financial disclosures 6 5 30 41 11 3.49 Medium
Promoting a reputation for transparent/
accurate reporting 6 14 28 31 16 3.38 Low
Providing a valuable marketing tool 8 17 27 34 11 3.24 Low
Revealing to outsiders the skill level of our 
managers 11 20 17 36 13 3.19 Low
Increasing the predictability of our  future 
prospects 8 16 31 16 16 3.18 Low
Keeping up with comparable companies 
operating in our industry 10 17 22 27 11 3.15 Low
Confirming market position and dissuades 
competitors 13 21 24 33 6 3.00 Low
Valuable to the launch of new products 14 17 27 32 6 2.98 Low
Beneficial if reciprocated by our competitors 17 21 29 21 2 2.64 Medium
Notes
1. Response categories are: 1=not important at all, 2=of little importance, 3=fairly 
important, 4=important, 5=very important.  
2. Standard deviation of less than or equal to 0.85 =high consensus; standard deviation 
of greater than 0.85 and less than or equal to 1.10 = medium consensus; standard 
deviation of greater than 1.10 = low consensus.
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Customer-focused incentives represented three of the top four 
incentives, although the level of consensus was low in all cases.  The 
most important incentive for the disclosure of marketing/customer 
relations information externally was ‘helping to create trustworthiness 
with customers’, with an average score of 3.90.  From the interviews it 
was apparent that this trust was created with new customers through 
recommendation by existing customers:
The most powerful way to sell to a customer is a reference.  You’ll 
typically always be asked for references within an industry.  The 
most credible thing you can do with a customer is say we’ve done 
the same thing for somebody else in the same industry.  So here’s 
the name of the person at the organisation, I’ll arrange for you to 
give the phone call or web conference or whatever and you talk to 
them direct.  [MD4]
When a new customer comes along and says ‘OK, I’m considering 
you and I’m considering company X and I’m considering company 
Y’, we can point to that external information and say ‘well you 
know, obviously a lot of the stuff we do is confidential, but these 
are examples of where our technology is being used’.  That gives 
people huge confidence.  [MD3]  
Although the value of recommendations was clear, interviewees also 
indicated that they found themselves increasingly in a position where 
they are unable to disclosure who their existing customers are:
We work with [a particular government department], we provide 
services to the [government department], the [government 
department] as a brand is hugely valuable to us but it’s hugely 
valuable to the [government department] and they will therefore 
in contracts often limit, or try to limit, what we are allowed to say 
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and how we are allowed to use the [government department’s] 
brand in our own materials.  [MD2]   
Therefore, there is clearly a conflict between disclosing customer 
relationship information to create trust with potential customers and in 
doing so violating trust with existing customers.  Retention of customers 
(average score 3.65) was considered only fractionally more important 
than attracting new customers (average score 3.63) by questionnaire 
respondents.  As one interviewee put it:
We’ll only disclose stuff that is consistent with how they [the 
customers] are going to market and that is very, very important.  
[MD3]
Only 38% of questionnaire respondents indicated that ‘keeping up 
with comparable companies operating in our industry’ was important or 
very important in the decision to externally disclose marketing/customer 
relations information.  However, this issue featured very prominently 
during the interviews:
There are certain precedents on what information you relate and 
how you relate it and when you relate it and that is set by your 
peers in the industry and so every time a competitor makes an 
announcement or even another company related to you, even if 
they’re operating in different segments, you need to take a look at 
it and take a view.  Do we want to respond or we’re not going to 
play that game because we don’t agree that’s good information to 
disclose.  [MD3]
We get hold of everybody’s newsletter or annual report that we 
think is good and we take the best parts out of that and try and 
incorporate it into our own.  So we do absolutely look at what 
other people are doing.  [MD1]
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It tends to be very much around the industry analyst communities.  
With those guys it tends to be very much of a ‘you show me yours 
and I’ll show you mine’ type of kiddie’s conversation, so we have 
to be able to disclose enough.  [MD4]
Only 38% of questionnaire respondents indicated that external 
disclosure was ‘valuable to the launch of new products’.  One interviewee, 
however, considered it crucial: 
We can show several generations of products using our technology.  
That then says because the last couple of generations of our 
technology worked really well in these products, it is lower risk 
and much better chance when we say our next generation will 
do it.  [MD3]
Approximately, 38% of questionnaire respondents indicated that 
‘beneficial if reciprocated by our competitors’ was not important at all 
or of little importance as an incentive to external disclosure; this was 
the lowest ranking incentive.  However, one interviewee highlighted the 
advantage from competitors’ disclosure but was reluctant to reciprocate: 
You do get some organisations that will put up an entire list of the 
entire customer base [on the web].  I’ll never do that.  All I do is 
go to my competitors and I copy those people and I go target them, 
because I now know they use those products.  [MD4]
Another interviewee noted that drawing comparisons from 
reciprocated disclosure was not beneficial in the absence of standardised 
performance indicators:
It would benefit people to have a comparative statistic.  So you 
know, just saying ‘Oh our customers gave us 4.2 out of 5’ that’s 
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meaningless to a customer if they don’t understand that actually 
everyone else got 4.8.  So it’s only as good as the industry coming up 
with some standards.  The trouble is of course... you’ve got different 
things mean different things to different people.  Very different 
business models for different business units.  [MD1] 
No significant differences existed between adjacent ranking 
incentives.  
Questionnaire respondents were asked their views in relation to 
the relative importance of certain disincentives to disclose marketing/
customer relations information.  Aggregate responses are shown in Table 
6.4, in descending rank order.
Table 6.4 The views of marketing directors on disincentives to 
voluntarily disclose marketing/customer relations 
information externally (n=68)
How important are the following 
disincentives in relation to your 
company’s voluntary disclosure 





score Consensus21 2 3 4 5
Avoiding giving away information 
which may harm our competitive 
position 0 2 14 25 52 4.37 High
Avoiding attracting unwanted scrutiny 
by regulators 3 11 23 30 27 3.70 Low
Avoiding attracting unwanted scrutiny 
by other stakeholders 5 6 23 37 21 3.68 Medium
Reducing the costs of collecting and 
disseminating information 17 30 19 16 10 2.67 Low
Notes
1. Response categories are: 1=not important at all, 2=of little importance, 3=fairly 
important, 4=important, 5=very important.  
2. Standard deviation of less than or equal to 0.85 =high consensus; standard deviation 
of greater than 0.85 and less than or equal to 1.10 = medium consensus; standard 
deviation of greater than 1.10 = low consensus.
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The most important disincentive was ‘avoiding giving away 
information which might harm our competitive position’, with an 
average score of 4.37.  This score is significantly higher than the next 
highest ranking item.  Approximately 77% of respondents viewed this 
as important or very important.  Competitive disadvantage dominated 
the interviews:
Whenever you put a piece of information out you’re equipping your 
competitors, you’re just making it easier for them to compete with 
you because they know what to focus on.  [MD3]  
The external disclosure of marketing/customer relations information 
appears to result from a cost-benefit trade off.  One interviewee talked 
about it in terms of ‘swings and roundabouts’:
You want to have as much information in the hands of your 
customers as possible and you want to have as little information 
in the hands of your competitors as possible.  [MD4]
We have to strike a balance of putting out data that says ‘look 
we’re the best at whatever we do’.  Every time you do that, that’s 
information that’s immediately seized upon by your competition 
as immediately they can then say ‘as long as we can have better 
numbers than these ones, then we can say we’re better than 
[company name]’.  [MD3]  
We must also be careful not to reveal too much of our product 
plans prematurely, as if we are late in development we provide 
ammunition for our competitors.  [MD3]
However, consistent with theory, information disclosed to 
competitors was not always considered to harm competitive position:
124 intellectual capital reporting: academic utopia or corporate reality in a Brave new world?
Most of our competitors are kind of philosophically in the same 
place as we are.  We do, on a non-competitive basis, share 
information with our competitors about what we are doing and 
why and how.  A big issue that affects the industry is something I 
think is perfectly legitimate to share relatively detailed information 
with competitors about.  We’re lobbying as an industry and 
inevitably in order to do that we have to share information about 
what we’re doing.  [MD2]
Approximately 57% and 58% of questionnaire respondents 
indicated that ‘avoiding attracting unwanted scrutiny by regulators’ 
(average score 3.70) and ‘avoiding attracting unwanted scrutiny by other 
stakeholders’ (average score 3.68) were important or very important, 
respectively.  ‘Reducing the costs of collecting and disseminating 
information’ was considered the least important disincentive to external 
disclosure with an average score of 2.67 ranking significantly below 
the other disincentives.  From the interviews, it was evident that the 
disclosure of marketing/customer relations information was not always 
entirely within the company’s control if they wanted to avoid potential 
legal/commercial penalties:   
We must be extremely careful to respect non-disclosure agreements 
and external relations strategies with our licensees/customers.  
[MD3]
Constraints placed on us by customers as to how/where/when we 
are allowed to use information about our relationship with them.  
Typically this is part of the contract agreement and has changed 
from unusual to normal over the past few years.  [MD4]
One interviewee mentioned the reluctance to create a disclosure 
precedent in relation to marketing/customer relations information:
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My point is that once you start, you can’t stop it because it will ask 
so many questions.  [MD1]
Another interviewee highlighted a non-disclosure precedent in 
relation to competitors, which support the findings by Gibbins et al. 
(1990) of firms developing internal preferences for managing disclosure:
We do not ever knock the opposition.  We set the tone that said 
there are competitors who do a very good job.  There are enough 
regulatory bodies around to say whether somebody is performing 
properly or not without us wading into it as the kind of all-knowing 
expert opinion.  So there are limitations on what we say, and I 
think that’s an example of it.  [MD2]
Communication channels and marketing/customer 
relations information
RQ4a: How effective are the various forms of communication in relation to 
the disclosure of [relational capital]?
Respondents were asked their views in relation to the effectiveness 
of various forms of written communication in relation to disclosing 
marketing/customer relations information.  The same six channels were 
listed for evaluation as for the human resources respondents.  Aggregate 
responses are shown in Table 6.5, where: 1= effective; 2 = neutral; 3 = 
ineffective.  The number of respondents indicating ‘don’t know’ (DK) or 
‘not applicable’ (N/A) were significant and are thus included in Table 6.5. 
The consensus of responses or extent of agreement among respondents 
is categorised as high, medium or low based on the standard deviation 
of responses.  The final column indicates whether the communication 
channel is viewed as effective or ineffective, based on whether the average 
score is statistically significantly different from neutral.
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Table 6.5  The views of marketing directors on marketing/customer 
relations information disclosure and forms of written 
communication (n=68)
Rate the following channels of 
corporate communication for 









of response31 2 3 DK N/A
Company web pages 71 17 11 2 0 1.39 Medium Effective
Annual corporate report 66 25 9 0 0 1.44 Medium Effective
Press releases 63 22 11 2 3 1.45 Medium Effective
Annual review 45 22 6 5 22 1.47 High Effective
Company newsletters (external) 29 22 11 3 35 1.70 Low Effective
Corporate social responsibility 
report 22 38 14 6 19 1.89 Medium Neutral
Notes
1. Response categories are: 1=effective, 2=neutral, 3=ineffective, DK=don’t know; 
N/A=not applicable.
2. Standard deviation of less than or equal to 0.65 = high consensus; standard deviation 
of greater than 0.65 and less than or equal to 0.75 = medium consensus; standard 
deviation of greater than 0.75 = low consensus.
3. Based on statistical test to identify if average scores are significantly different from 
2-neutral.
‘Company web pages’ were considered the most effective written 
communication for disclosing marketing/customer relations information 
externally, with approximately 71% of respondents viewing it as effective. 
As one interviewee put it:
Whenever people are considering working with us, nine times out 
of ten they’ll have gone to your website and formed a view on what 
is on your website, and so the web is absolutely fundamental to 
the business because it sets expectations before they’ve even talked 
to you.  [MD3]
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The annual report was considered to be effective by 66% of 
questionnaire respondents with an average score of 1.44.  However, it 
was evident from the interviews that, despite its effectiveness, the annual 
report’s impact was viewed as limited in relation to the external disclosure 
of marketing/customer relations information:
Well it’s not the case of it [the annual report] isn’t effective, but 
it only reaches certain people.  [MD3]
I absolutely view it [the corporate annual report] as a marketing 
document.  But I understand the audience who it’s talking to is 
very limited to those who are wanting to invest in your company, 
rather than take products out with you.  [MD1] 
The people you actually want to read the annual report are 
prospective customers, they don’t read those, they don’t care.  [MD4] 
Several interviewees appeared to have a very negative view in relation 
to the effectiveness of the annual report in the current climate.  Their 
negativity appeared to stem from both the timeliness of the information 
and the amount of mandatory and standardised disclosure required 
under current regulations: 
For me it’s [the annual report] an anachronism.  The days of hard 
copy annual report are, in my view, over.  Nobody cares.  [MD4]
Annual reports are an annual snapshot in time and worse than 
that, they are an annual snapshot that is typically procured and 
published four or five months after the year ended.  So you could 
be looking at information that’s twenty months old – who cares? 
[MD4]
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There should be a printing press set up somewhere that does the 
standard 97 pages at the back of every report and accounts, because 
it’s always the same, just change the numbers.  Who cares frankly? 
Have the auditors signed you off as being moral, ethical and non-
fattening? Yes, lovely, that’s it they’re legal.  So all the rest is kind 
of pants! [MD2] 
Approximately 63% of questionnaire respondents viewed press 
releases as an effective channel of communication.  The importance of 
press releases was also highlighted during the interviews: 
Press releases are bread and butter for us and particularly when 
you look at how the web feeds have developed now.  The press 
release will get quickly dropped into any number of e-newsletters 
and e-zines1.  [MD3]
Press releases are much more aimed at people who are not customers, 
they are much more aimed at the wider community and just 
informing people you are active in doing things.  Making sure 
people understand we’re still here, we’re still alive, we’re still doing 
well, is actually one of the key things we have to deliver to the 
organisation.  [MD4] 
We like to put announcements out any time we do a major deal 
because that shows how more and more people are using our 
technology – that adds value externally.  [MD3]
External company newsletters were viewed as effective by only 29% 
of respondents.  From the interviews, company newsletters seemed to 
primarily focus on internal communication with employees.  As one 
interviewee put it:
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Company newsletters are all about keeping your own staff and 
existing customer base informed about how wonderfully you’re 
doing.  [MD4]
The corporate social responsibility report was considered an 
effective channel of communicating marketing/customer relations 
information by only 22% of questionnaire respondents and on average 
it was deemed to be neutral.  Questionnaire respondents were asked 
to state any other effective channels of communication for marketing/
customer relations information.  Trade shows, conferences and events 
for customers/prospects were widely cited as effective channels for face-
to-face communication externally.  This view was also evident from the 
interviews:
We will go to our major industry conference and our customers 
will be part of the audience.  [MD4] 
We have country based user groups where we will get people 
[customers] together usually at a relatively technical level.  I 
organise a global conference which we call our customer advisory 
board, which aims to get our top twenty five customers around 
the world together for a three day conference.  The opening of the 
conference is spent with them telling us what their fundamental 
business and technology drivers are for next year.  [MD4]  
If correctly targeted it’s [trade show] extremely effective.  The 
primary purpose we’re there is because all the people we want to 
speak to are there too.  [MD3]
A further explanation as to the effectiveness of this type of face-to-
face communication was suggested by one of the interviewees:
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We tend to use face-to-face communication, or verbal 
communication, you can be much more open, because it’s not 
traceable, to be honest.  [MD4]
This appears to suggest that the same information is not disclosed 
in the same away across all channels of communication.  From the 
interviews, it was apparent that this was indeed the case: 
I like to think that every channel we use we package it differently.  
The core of it will be the same information but we package it 
differently.  The level of detail we’ll go into on the web pages will 
be more than we’ll put into our annual report.  [MD3]
During the interviews it was evident that the marketing function is 
one of the significant contributors to corporate external communication. 
This justifies the inclusion of the views and opinions of marketing 
functional specialists in the present research:
Marketing drives external communication in this company in all 
aspects.  We work as a team between CEO and CFO.  [MD3]
It’s [the annual report] the one piece of external collateral 
over which marketing does not have complete control, we own 
everything else.  We don’t own the annual report, the finance 
department own that, but we control things like the look, the feel, 
the photography, the imagery, the style.  We write all the solutions 
stuff, we largely create the corporate social responsibility section and 
we will comment and edit major commentaries upfront.  [MD4]
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Summary: marketing directors’ views
The evidence presented in this chapter supports the following main 
conclusions regarding marketing directors’ views: 
•	 RQ1: Marketing/customer relations components – all of the 
marketing/customer relations components investigated contribute 
to company value to some degree.  ‘Customer relationships’ 
contribute to company value the most.  ‘Company reputation’, 
‘competitive edge in terms of quality of product/service’, and 
‘data/knowledge of customers’ were also ranked in the top four 
components.  ‘Data/knowledge of customers’ is important in 
generating new business.  It is difficult to separately identify the 
importance of components as many are interrelated.  
•	 RQ2: Internal use and external disclosure of relational capital – 
‘data/knowledge of customers’, ‘marketing strategies’, ‘customer 
relationships’ and ‘competitive edge in terms of cost of product/
service’ were the top four components used internally by company 
management.  Companies struggle with methods of obtaining 
and coordinating information about their customers.  External 
disclosure carries the risk of customer poaching by competitors. 
External disclosure of the majority of marketing/customer relations 
components is low.  
•	 RQ3a: Incentives to voluntarily disclose relational capital – all 
of the reasons investigated provide an incentive to voluntarily 
disclosure marketing/customer relations information to some 
degree.  Customer-focused incentives represented three of the 
top four incentives.  The most important incentive was ‘helping 
to create trustworthiness with customers’.  There is a conflict 
between disclosing customer relationship information to create 
trust with potential customers and violating trust with existing 
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customers.  Comparative statistics would be of benefit but only in 
the presence of industry performance indicators.  This is difficult 
because different measures are important to different companies. 
•	 RQ3a: Disincentives to voluntarily disclose relational capital – all of 
the reasons investigated provide a disincentive to the voluntary 
disclosure of marketing/customer relations information to some 
degree.  ‘Avoiding giving away “company secrets” or otherwise 
harming competitive position’ was significantly more important 
than all other disincentives.  Disclosure is a trade-off between 
providing information to customers and preventing competitors 
from receiving the information.  Disclosure is not always within a 
company’s control if they want to avoid potential legal/commercial 
penalties.
•	 RQ4a: Communication channels  – all of the written communication 
channels investigated were considered effective for the external 
disclosure of marketing/customer relations information with 
the exception of the CSR report.  Company web pages were the 
most effective.  The annual report was criticised for the timeliness 
of information and the amount of mandatory and standardised 
disclosure required under current regulations.  The primary focus 
for company newsletters is on internal communication with 
employees.  Trade shows, conferences, and events for customers/
prospects were widely cited as effective channels for face-to-face 
communication externally.  The marketing function is one of the 
significant contributors to corporate external communication.
Endnote
1  E-zine is a generic term commonly applied to small magazines and newsletters 
distributed by any electronic method, for example, by electronic mail.
7conclusions
Introduction
This chapter begins by presenting the main findings of the study for 
the three respondent groups in relation to each of the main research 
issues.  Subsequent sections cover: conclusions; policy implications; the 
contribution of the study; and further research.
Main findings of study
This study has undertaken questionnaire surveys of three key 
preparer groups drawn from UK domestic listed companies.  Ninety 
three finance directors completed the main IC questionnaire (focussing 
on all three IC categories), with shorter variants being completed by 
67 human resources specialists (focussing on human capital) and 68 
marketing specialists (focussing on relational capital).  Across the three 
groups, the 228 responses represent a 10.5% response rate.  Seventeen 
follow-up interviews were conducted to explore the issues further.  
Importance of IC in value creation (RQ1)
Consistent with the high and variable market-to-book values 
observed in practice, the majority of finance directors believed that 50% 
or more of corporate value is attributable to IC.  All 28 of the listed IC 
components were viewed by finance directors to contribute to company 
value to some degree.  The top four comprised three relational capital 
components (‘customer relationships’; ‘competitive edge in terms of 
quality of product/service’; and ‘company reputation’) and one human 
capital component (‘employee skills and education’).  The functional 
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specialists believed that all 18 detailed human capital components and 
all 18 detailed relational capital components contributed to company 
value to some degree.  ‘Employee skills and education’; ‘employee 
commitment’; ‘positive employee attitudes’; and ‘positive employee 
behaviour’ were ranked the top four human capital components. 
‘Customer relationships’; ‘company reputation’; ‘competitive edge in 
terms of quality of product/service’; and ‘data/knowledge of customers’ 
were ranked the top four relational capital components.  However, the 
high level of variation in responses relating to individual components 
was striking.  
Insights into these rankings were provided by the interviews, and 
emphasised the relatedness and interactions between components.  For 
example, the interaction between individual human capital components 
such as skills, attitude and behaviour is important in the value creation 
process.  Additionally, human capital components connect with the other 
IC categories of structural and relational capital and become transformed 
into the categories of IC which the market focuses on as value drivers.
Internal management use compared with external disclosure (RQ2)
Functional specialists indicated the level of internal management 
use and external disclosure of the detailed components, allowing the 
levels to be contrasted.  For human capital, ‘employee training and 
development’; ‘workplace safety’; ‘employee remuneration procedures’; 
‘employee turnover’; and ‘recruitment and selection procedures’ were 
the top four components used internally by company management 
(by 82% or more).  However, with the exception of ‘workplace safety’, 
external disclosure of the vast majority of human capital components 
was low (under 50%).  Interviews revealed that companies attempted 
to capture information on the less tangible human capital components 
through opinion surveys, appraisal reviews and manager observation. 
For relational capital, ‘data/knowledge of customers’; ‘marketing 
strategies’; ‘customer relationships’; and ‘competitive edge in terms of 
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cost of product/service’ were the top four components used internally 
by company management.  Interestingly, however, these were not the 
components most frequently disclosed externally (which were ‘brand 
names’ and ‘product portfolio’).  Interviews revealed that external 
disclosure of customer components carried the risk of customer poaching 
by competitors.  Companies struggled with methods of obtaining and 
coordinating information about their customers.  
Incentives and disincentives in relation to IC disclosure (RQ3)
All of the listed incentives and disincentives were believed to 
significantly affect the voluntary disclosure of IC, although the average 
importance varied considerably.  Finance directors evaluated 18 incentives 
and 13 disincentives while the specialist evaluated 13 incentives and four 
disincentives.  The items listed for each group overlapped to some extent. 
Finance directors considered that capital market-related incentives 
dominated the disclosure of IC information in general, followed in the 
mid-ranks by marketing-related incentives and finally human capital-
related incentives.  The opportunity to increase transparency to capital 
markets in terms of ‘helping to correct an undervalued share price’ was 
significantly more important than all other incentives.  It was found 
that the importance of incentives varied according to the category of 
IC information being disclosed.  ‘Helping to correct an undervalued 
share price’ was most important in the disclosure of both structural 
and relational capital, whereas ‘helping to create trustworthiness with 
employees’ was most important in the disclosure of human capital. 
Capital market incentives dominated the disclosure of structural capital. 
However, the disclosure of human capital and relational capital were 
also driven by incentives which relate to the category of information 
being disclosed.
The human resources specialists reported that ‘helping to attract 
new employees of high calibre’ and ‘helping to retain employees of high 
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calibre’ were the most important incentives in relation to human capital, 
while finance directors rated ‘revealing to outsiders the skill level of our 
managers’ as the highest human capital component.  The marketing 
specialists viewed customer-focused incentives as the leading marketing-
related incentives.  The most important incentive was ‘helping to create 
trustworthiness with customers’.  
The interviews offered insights into the conflict between disclosing 
customer relationship information to create trust with potential 
customers and violating trust with existing customers.  Comparative 
statistics (KPIs) were deemed to be of value for benchmarking purposes 
only in the presence of industry performance indicators.  It was 
recognised that the standardisation of such indicators is difficult because 
different measures are important to different companies.  
In terms of disincentives, ‘avoiding giving away “company secrets” 
or otherwise harming competitive position’ was the most important 
disincentive for all three groups.  ‘Preventing the creation of unrealistic 
expectations’ and ‘avoiding setting a disclosure precedent’ were ranked 
second and third in importance, respectively.  Finance directors did 
not consider that the importance attached to these disincentives varied 
significantly across the three categories of IC information.  It became 
clear during interviews that competitive disadvantage is not always a 
disincentive to IC disclosure, suggesting that IC disclosure drivers are 
very much situation-specific.  Additional disincentives mentioned by 
human resources specialists included internal data capture, comparability, 
and relevance.  The marketing specialists emphasised that disclosure is a 
trade-off between providing information to customers and preventing 
competitors from receiving the information.  Disclosure is not always 
within a company’s control if they want to avoid potential legal/
commercial penalties.
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Communication channels for IC disclosure and the role of the annual 
report (RQ4)
Finance directors evaluated a list of 14 alternative communication 
channels in relation to each of the three categories of IC, with both 
specialist groups evaluating a shorter list of six written channels in 
relation to their functional category of IC.  Finance directors evaluated 
‘one-to-one meetings with investors’, ‘one-to-one meetings with analysts’ 
and ‘investor presentations’ as the three most effective communication 
channels for disclosing all three categories of IC information.  Several 
other channels were also effective, including the ‘annual corporate 
report’ and ‘company web pages’.  The ‘interim report’ and ‘conference 
calls’ were considered ineffective for all three IC categories.  Human 
resources specialists rated the corporate annual report as the most effective 
channel, significantly higher than the other channels, whereas marketing 
specialists rated company web pages as marginally more effective than 
the annual report.
The annual report was considered effective in communicating basic 
IC information; however its usefulness for communicating complex 
IC information or new, previously undisclosed IC information was 
questioned.  Companies used various channels to communicate IC 
information and a number of them appear to present or package the 
information in a different manner according to the communication 
channel being used.  Interviews revealed that both the human resources 
function and the marketing function contributed significantly to the 
content of the annual report.  For the human resources specialists, 
the importance of communication to employees took precedence over 
the external communication about human resources.  The marketing 
specialists cited trade shows, conferences, and events for customers/
prospects as effective channels for face-to-face communication externally. 
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Conclusions 
The importance of IC to the creation of company value is confirmed, 
as is the importance of each main IC category and the components of each 
category.  Clearly, therefore, accounting for IC (also known as intangibles 
or knowledge resources) matters.  The principal themes running through 
the findings of this study are diversity and the situation-specific nature 
of IC and, therefore, its disclosure (in terms of IC information content 
and communication channels).  Several findings illustrate these themes. 
First, the high level of variation in responses relating to the importance 
of individual IC components for value creation suggests that IC is 
situation-specific, driven by each company’s individual business model. 
Second, the incentives to disclose IC externally are found to vary 
by IC category (although the disincentives did not).  
Third, competitive disadvantage, the main disincentive on 
average, consistent with the findings of several prior studies, was not 
a disincentive in the eyes of all respondents.  This also suggests that 
IC disclosure drivers are situation-specific.  So too, does the finding 
that disclosure is constrained by regulation in some industry sectors 
(e.g. pharmaceutical, defence) and by customer sensitivities in others. 
Disclosure about customer relationships can sometimes create trust 
with potential customers only at the expense of undermining the trust 
of existing customers.
Fourth, the relative importance of the incentives to disclose IC vary 
by the functional area of respondents, with finance directors emphasising 
capital-market-related incentives.  However, from the perspective of 
the marketing specialists, relational capital disclosures could assist in 
gaining repeat and new business from customers; from the perspective 
of the human resources specialists, human capital disclosure could assist 
in the retention and recruitment of high calibre employees.  Indeed, 
company value itself is enhanced through the mere disclosure of these 
value-creating IC components, consistent with Toms (2002) suggestion.
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Finally, a range of communication channels were used to 
communicate IC information, consistent with the findings of Unerman 
et al. (2007); moreover, some variation occurred in channel use for each 
IC category.  Each channel appeared to call for a different packaging of 
the information.
Policy implications
Since it is shown that IC matters in value creation, it is incumbent 
upon the accounting profession to work with the various interested 
parties to develop and implement external reporting standards and 
guidelines that optimally trade-off the benefits and costs of disclosure in 
relation to stakeholder groups.  The investor group wishes information 
for valuation purposes, but would not want disclosure to adversely 
impact shareholder value; other stakeholder groups also have an interest 
in knowing about aspects of companies’ IC.  
Establishing what IC information should be disclosed, in what 
format and through what mix of channels is a complex issue.  Inevitably, 
one is left questioning whether meaningful and effective regulation in 
this area is desirable.  If so, at what level should it operate – specific 
rules/guidelines that apply universally across industries, rules/guidelines 
specific to industry sectors (with the level of granularity of industry sector 
to be defined at a high, mid or low level), or generic rules/guidelines 
that permit company-specific application?  
Owing to the situation-specific nature of IC, it would seem that 
regulators can’t hope to address this issue in its entirety.  The participants 
in this study appear to support the development of standardised industry 
benchmarks for key IC component groups.  A degree of IC is unique 
to individual companies and the company is best placed to describe 
this uniqueness in its own terms.  However, there does appear to be 
some common ground.  This study has, for example, highlighted those 
relational capital and human capital components which are considered 
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by a representative cross-section of preparers to be significantly more 
important than other components.  These key components provide a 
focus for future research – what do they mean in different companies 
and how do they create value?
There is an opportunity to investigate whether a set of industry-
specific standardised metrics can be developed and their disclosure 
regulated.  Regulators and other stakeholders need to be fully aware 
of the industry constraints which prevent disclosure, specifically in 
relation to customers and products.  Further research into constraints 
across all industries would appear to be a necessary precursor to industry 
disclosure standards.
Our principal recommendation is for the IASB to find the resources 
to place the intangibles project on its active agenda.  This will help to 
generate further research into IC, its measurement and its disclosure.  The 
IASB should not procrastinate in this area, as the future of the accounting 
profession and its role as the key reporting function depends on it.
Contribution
This study makes three contributions to the literature on IC.  First, 
it investigates, for the first time, the views of key personnel regarding 
the nature of IC, its measurement and its disclosure across the finance, 
human resources and marketing functions.  Second, it investigates 
whether disclosure incentives and disincentives vary across the three 
main IC categories.  Third, it undertakes a large-scale questionnaire of 
UK preparers’ views regarding IC and its disclosure.  The findings add 
to the significant body of ICAS-funded research on intangibles and IC 
in the UK (Fincham and Roslender, 2003; Holland, 2004; Davison 
and Skerratt, 2006; Mangena et al., 2010; and Roslender et al., 2009). 
141concluSionS
Further research
No study can hope to address all of the aspects of a particular issue. 
Three suggestions for further research emerge naturally from the research 
presented here.  First, preparer responses from three functional areas 
are presented here.  It would be interesting to extend the research by 
surveying corporate decision makers without functional responsibilities, 
such as the chairman, the CEO and other non-executive board members. 
This would provide insights into the importance of IC relative to other 
board issues.  In addition, it would be interesting to compare and 
contrast the views of key corporate advisors, shareholders and other 
stakeholder groups.  Second, future research could usefully undertake 
more finely grained analysis at the industry level, to identify possible 
industry patterns in the relative importance of IC components in value 
creation.  Third, it would be very interesting to undertake a longitudinal 
analysis of market-to-book values, to investigate the impact of the recent 
financial crisis.  
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Appendix 1
Intellectual capital terms identified from prior literature
Human capital Structural capital Relational capital
Absence Achieving mechanism culture Basic marketing capability
Adaptability Administrative processes Brands
Attitudes Brands Business collaborations
Capability/abilities Communication systems Client profile
Commitment Competitive and market channels Collaboration
Communicative abilities Copyrights Commercial power
Competence Corporate/organisational culture Competitive intelligence
Computer literacy Cultural diversity Competitors
Creativity Culture Connectivity
Development Customer support Customer knowledge
Education Customer-centred Customer loyalty
Employee expertise Databases Customer names
Employee flexibility Distribution channels Customer reputation
Employee knowledge Documentation services Customer satisfaction
Employee productivity Financial relations Customers
Employee satisfaction Infrastructure Diffusion
Employee value Innovation Distribution channels
Employees Intellectual property Environmental activities
Entrepreneurial spirit Intellectual resources Favourable contracts
Equality Knowledge centre Financial contracts
Expert networks Knowledge-based infrastructure Franchising agreements
Expert teams Laboratories Image
Friendliness Management philosophy Intensity
Further personal/
professional training
Management processes Knowledge/acquaintance with     
community
Human assets Operation process Knowledge/acquaintance with 
government
Human resources Organisational flexibility Knowledge/acquaintance with 
suppliers
Human value Organisational learning Licensing agreements
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Intellectual capital terms identified from prior literature (Cont.)
Human capital Structural capital Relational capital
Identification Organisational routines Links with suppliers
Innovation Organisational structure Market intensity
Innovative capacity Patents Negotiating capacity with 
financial entities
Juristic competence Procedures Networking
Know-how (employees) Process capability New strategic customers
Learning capacity Quality improvements Reputation
Loyalty to organisation Quality management Research collaborations
Motivation Research projects Stakeholders
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Intellectual Capital Reporting: Academic Utopia 
or Corporate Reality in a Brave New World?
Intellectual capital creates company value but generally this value is not 
recognised in the financial statements of companies.  This report moves 
forward the debate on how intellectual capital should be recognised and/
or disclosed in the annual reports of companies by offering new evidence 
regarding the views of finance directors, human resources specialists and 
marketing specialists, all of whom have a particular interest in intellectual 
capital resources.
The issues investigated include: the relative importance of intellectual 
capital components to the generation of company value; the level of internal 
management use compared to external disclosure of intellectual capital; the 
incentives and disincentives for disclosure; and the effectiveness of the annual 
report and other forms of corporate communication for the disclosure of 
intellectual capital.
The generally high level of variation in responses shows that there is 
considerable diversity in the extent of company value attributable to 
intellectual capital and in disclosure incentives and disincentives and hence 
in disclosure content and the communication channels used. The authors 
conclude that it is this diversity which represents the most significant 
challenge to standard-setters as they consider how to address intellectual 
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